Prior studies on real earnings management (REM) focus mainly on estimating abnormal operating and investing activities at the firm level. We extend this literature by providing micro-level evidence regarding how financial reporting pressures influence new product release decisions, or product-level REM. Specifically, we compare how public and private studios differentially time the release of their movies. We find that, faced with pressure to boost quarterly revenues and earnings, public studios are more likely to release movies with high expected revenues in the last month of a fiscal quarter, compared to private studios. This documented result is stronger for firms with recent poor past performance, but is not present for movies in genres with a more targeted release window (e.g., romance and horror movies) and those using directors who have a history of collaboration with the studio. These results suggest that studios choose REM activities that have a lower impact on consumer demand and that minimize conflict with talent, consistent with choosing less costly activities to achieve financial reporting goals. A negative consequence of this financial reporting–driven product release strategy is that movies released in the last month of a quarter have lower international box office revenues. Taken together, these results provide evidence of the existence and consequences of product-level REM.

We examine the application of real options within two contexts of motion picture investment decisions by studio executives. The first is whether to continue marketing a film following its initial release in theaters (an abandonment option). The second centers on the decision to produce a sequel to an original film (a growth option). Few accounting studies have examined the use of real options but they are of considerable importance to companies managing risk through their cost structure and capital investment decisions. Specifically, a real option allows decision makers to postpone further expenditure commitment until a substantial portion of the uncertainty surrounding the investment has been resolved. Our evidence from the motion picture industry indicates that studios leave a portion of their marketing budget uncommitted until its spending is warranted. We also show that studios invest more in original films that they believe will lead to a sequel. Specifically, we find that studios spend higher production and marketing costs on films with sequels than those without, and that sequels generate higher returns on investment than non-sequels. Overall, our results suggest that the real options framework has applications for accounting research and practice by providing a basis for studying and understanding cost commitments in product or project-based settings.