This paper presents an analytical model of underwriting capacity and insurance market equilibrium under an asymmetric corporate tax schedule characterized by incomplete tax-loss offsets. We show that reinsurance causes tax shields to be reallocated to those insurers that have the greatest capacity for utilizing them. Reinsurance is therefore used as an efficient short-run mechanism to yield the optimal allocation of tax shield benefits. In equilibrium, asymmetric taxes cause insurance prices to be actuarially unfair, and the expected return on capital invested in insurance reflects the probability of paying taxes.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: G22.

A discrete-time option-pricing model is used to derive the “fair” rate of return for the property-liability insurance firm. The rationale for the use of this model is that the financial claims of shareholders, policyholders, and tax authorities can be modeled as European options written on the income generated by the insurer's asset portfolio. This portfolio consists mostly of traded financial assets and is therefore relatively easy to value. By setting the value of the shareholders' option equal to the initial surplus, an implicit solution for the fair insurance price may be derived. Unlike previous insurance regulatory models, this approach addresses the ruin probability of the insurer, as well as nonlinear tax effects.

A discrete‐time option‐pricing model is used to derive the “fair” rate of return for the property‐liability insurance firm. The rationale for the use of this model is that the financial claims of shareholders, policyholders, and tax authorities can be modeled as European options written on the income generated by the insurer's asset portfolio. This portfolio consists mostly of traded financial assets and is therefore relatively easy to value. By setting the value of the shareholders' option equal to the initial surplus, an implicit solution for the fair insurance price may be derived. Unlike previous insurance regulatory models, this approach addresses the ruin probability of the insurer, as well as nonlinear tax effects.