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Trade in Producer Services and in Other Specialized Intermediate Inputs

American Economic Review 1989 79(1), 85-95
Many producer services are knowledge-intensive, requiring a high initial investment in learning, after which the knowledge can be provided to additional users at low cost. A monopolistic-competition type model is developed to analyze these producer services. Trade only in final goods is an imperfect and inferior substitute for trade in the specialized inputs, due to the complementarity between domestic and foreign specialized inputs, or alternatively the gains from an increased division of labor.

Nash Equilibrium Tariffs for the United States and Canada: The Roles of Country Size, Scale Economies, and Capital Mobility

Journal of Political Economy 1989 97(2), 368-386
A theoretical analysis of "optimal" (Nash equilibrium) tariff rates is presented. A numerical general equilibrium model is then used to find Nash equilibrium tariff rates for the United States and Canada. The Nash equilibrium tariffs are small relative to partial equilibrium estimates: 18 percent for the United States and 6 percent for Canada. The United States is essentially indifferent between the Nash equilibrium and free trade, while Canada is better off at the latter by $4 billion. Empirical results support theoretical predictions that the optimal tariff is smaller when the country is smaller, there are scale economies and free entry, and capital is internationally mobile.

Nash Equilibrium Tariffs for the United States and Canada: The Roles of Country Size, Scale Economies, and Capital Mobility

Journal of Political Economy 1989 97(2), 368-386
A theoretical analysis of "optimal" (Nash equilibrium) tariff rates is presented. A numerical general equilibrium model is then used to find Nash equilibrium tariff rates for the United States and Canada. The Nash equilibrium tariffs are small relative to partial equilibrium estimates: 18 percent for the United States and 6 percent for Canada. The United States is essentially indifferent between the Nash equilibrium and free trade, while Canada is better off at the latter by $4 billion. Empirical results support theoretical predictions that the optimal tariff is smaller when the country is smaller, there are scale economies and free entry, and capital is internationally mobile.