My research suggests that world inequality is explained by the incidence of extractive and inclusive institutions. But why do some countries have extractive institutions? I distinguish between two main reasons; first, power relations; second, the “normative order.” Normative orders provide justifications and legitimacy for institutions which may not generate prosperity, but may achieve other goals. These distinctions are critical because they create very different challenges in trying to make institutions more inclusive and create prosperity. I show how countries move from the economic periphery as a consequence of changing both. My own intellectual journey has been in the other direction, however, hence the title of the paper: I was fortunate to be born in Britain, but I have had to unlearn much of my own experience, socialization and training in order to see other societies on their own terms. That’s crucial to be able to help them, but also to learn from them. (JEL D02, D63, E23, K00, O43, Q32)

Herbst argues that Africa is plagued by “state failure” to provide certain public goods in society, such as law and order, defense, contract enforcement, and infrastructure. Herbst has provided a bold, historically informed theoretical analysis, essential reading for economists interested in comparative institutions and development.

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T WO HUNDRED and seventeen years after Adam Smith's publication, An Inquiry Into Wealth of Nations, comes Partha Dasgupta's An Inquiry into Well-Being and Destitution, which apparently is intended to be equally broad-ranging. Smith identified two forces that regulated level of per caput consumption in any nation, first being the skill, dexterity and judgment with which its labor is generally applied, and second being the proportion between number of those who employed in useful labour and that of those who not so employed. He distinguished sharply between savage nations of hunters and fishers from civilized and thriving nations. Although in former every individual who is able to work is more or less employed in useful labour, most are so miserably poor, that from mere want, they frequently reduced, or, at least, think themselves reduced, to necessity of sometimes destroying and sometimes of abandoning their infants, their old people, and those afflicted with lingering diseases, to perish with hunger or to be devoured by wild beasts (Smith 1937, pp. lviilviii). In contrast, in latter nations,

This paper proposes a new framework for studying the interplay between culture and institutions. We interpret culture as a repertoire, consisting of (cultural) attributes and allowing rich cultural responses to political changes. Combinations of attributes produce cultural configurations, which provide social meaning, coordination and political justification. Our framework has several distinctive features. First, it proposes a “systems approach” to culture: the meaning and function of attributes are determined within the whole configuration and political equilibrium. Second, it emphasizes discontinuous or “saltational” changes in culture—rather than gradual, evolutionary changes—as attributes are reconnected and acquire new meanings in response to evolving circumstances and as outcomes in ongoing “cultural struggles”. Third, our framework puts the spotlight on how fluidly different cultures can respond to conditions, depending on the nature of their attributes and constraints on their connections. Finally, it enriches the study of the co-determination of political, institutional and cultural outcomes.

A central idea in political economy is that vot ers who are not ideologically attached to a politi cal party, so-called “swing voters,” attract policy favors and redistribution because they become the focus of electoral competition. In many parts of the world, however, politicians do not just use carrots to win elections, they also use sticks— coercion and violence. In this paper, we show that expanding the “policy space” to incorporate this can completely overturn the predictions of the standard model. The reason for this is simple. With all groups of voters at play, political competition does indeed lead to a chase for the sup

We construct a model to study the implications of changes in political institutions for economic institutions. A change in political institutions alters the distribution of de jure political power, but creates incentives for investments in de facto political power to partially or even fully offset change in de jure power. The model can imply a pattern of captured democracy, whereby a democratic regime may survive but choose economic institutions favoring an elite. The model provides conditions under which economic or policy outcomes will be invariant to changes in political institutions, and economic institutions themselves will persist over time. (JEL D02, D72) The domination of an organized minority … over the unorganized majority is inevitable. The power of any minority is irresistible as against each single individual in the majority, who stands alone before the totality of the organized minority. At the same time, the minority is organized for the very reason that it is a minority. —Gaetano Mosca (1939, 53).