This article provides empirical evidence of behavioural responses by banks in the recent crisis. Using firm-specific balance sheet data, we construct aggregate indicators of systemic risk. Measures of size and herding show that balance sheet adjustments have been pro-cyclical in the crisis, while responses became increasingly dependent across banks and concentrated on certain market segments. Banks reacted less according to a pecking order, as an indication of reduced flexibility in their risk management opportunities. The behavioural indicators are useful tools for monetary and macro prudential analyses and can contribute to the micro foundations of financial stability models.

We investigate the liquidity management of 62 Dutch banks between January 2004 and March 2010, when these banks were subject to a liquidity regulation that is very similar to Basel III’s Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR). We find that most banks hold more liquid assets against their stock of liquid liabilities, such as demand deposits, than strictly required under the regulation. More solvent banks hold fewer liquid assets against their stock of liquid liabilities, suggesting an interaction between capital and liquidity buffers. However, this interaction turns out to be weaker during a crisis. Although not required, some banks consider cash flows scheduled beyond 1month ahead when setting liquidity asset holdings, but they seldom look further ahead than 1year.