When the fraction of a firm's cash held overseas is greater, its shareholders value that cash lower. This goes beyond a pure tax effect: the repatriation tax friction disrupts the firm's internal capital market, distorting its investment policy. Firms underinvest domestically and overinvest abroad. Our findings are more pronounced when firms are subject to higher repatriation tax rates, higher costs of borrowing, and more agency problems. Overall, our evidence suggests that a combination of taxes, financing frictions, and agency problems leads to a valuation discount for foreign cash and documents real effects of how foreign earnings are taxed.

We compare chief executive officer (CEO) turnover in public and large private firms. Public firms have higher turnover rates and exhibit greater turnover–performance sensitivity (TPS) than private firms. When we control for pre-turnover performance, performance improvements are greater for private firms than for public firms. We investigate whether these differences are due to differences in quality of accounting information, the CEO candidate pool, CEO power, board structure, ownership structure, investor horizon, or certain unobservable differences between public and private firms. One factor contributing to public firms’ higher turnover rates and greater TPS appears to be investor myopia.

When the fraction of a firm’s cash held overseas is greater, its shareholders value that cash lower. This goes beyond a pure tax effect: the repatriation tax friction disrupts the firm’s internal capital market, distorting its investment policy. Firms underinvest domestically and overinvest abroad. Our findings are more pronounced when firms are subject to higher repatriation tax rates, higher costs of borrowing, and more agency problems. Overall, our evidence suggests that a combination of taxes, financing frictions, and agency problems leads to a valuation discount for foreign cash and documents real effects of how foreign earnings are taxed. Received January 19, 2015; editorial decision September 22, 2016 by Editor David Denis.

U.S. industrial firms invest heavily in noncash, risky financial assets such as corporate debt, equity, and mortgage‐backed securities. Risky assets represent 40% of firms’ financial portfolios, or 6% of total book assets. We present a formal model to assess the optimality of this behavior. Consistent with the model, risky assets are concentrated in financially unconstrained firms holding large financial portfolios, are held by poorly governed firms, and are discounted by 13% to 22% compared to safe assets. We conclude that this activity represents an unregulated asset management industry of more than $1.5 trillion, questioning the traditional boundaries of nonfinancial firms.