Using life insurance holdings by age, sex, and marital status, we infer how individuals value consumption in different demographic stages. We estimate equivalence scales and bequest motives simultaneously within a fully specified model where agents face US demographics and save and purchase life insurance. Our findings indicate that individuals are very caring for dependents, that economies of scale are large, that children are very costly (or yield very high marginal utility), that wives with children produce lots of home goods, and that females display habits from marriage, while men do not. These findings contrast sharply with standard equivalence scales.

We find that technology's effect on employment varies greatly across manufacturing industries. Some industries exhibit a temporary reduction in employment in response to a permanent increase in TFP, whereas many more industries exhibit an employment increase in response to a permanent TFP shock. This raises serious questions about existing work that finds a labor productivity shock has a strong negative effect on employment. There are tantalizing and interesting differences between TFP and labor productivity. We argue that TFP is a more natural measure of technology because labor productivity reflects shifts in the input mix as well as in technology.

We investigate the welfare properties of the one-sector neoclassical growth model with uninsurable idiosyncratic shocks. We focus on the notion of constrained efficiency used in the general equilibrium literature. Our characterization of constrained efficiency uses the first-order condition of a constrained planner’s problem. This condition highlights the margins of relevance for whether capital is too high or too low: the factor composition of income of the (consumption-) poor. Using three calibrations commonly considered in the literature, we illustrate that there can be either over- or underaccumulation of capital in steady state and that the constrained optimum may or may not be consistent with a nondegenerate long-run distribution of wealth. For the calibration that roughly matches the income and wealth distribution, the constrained inefficiency of the market outcome is rather striking: it has much too low a steady-state capital stock.