Reviewers use expectations about the client and preparer to help form perceptions of the probability of preparer error and relative accountability to the client and financial statement users (Gibbins and Trotman 2002; Rich et al. 1997b). Experimental findings suggest these perceptions interact to affect reviewers' agreement with the preparers' work and decisions about the amount of preparer follow-up work required. Further, the nature of reviewer cognition, as measured by the relative proportion of critical and supportive reviewer elaboration explains a significant portion of the effect of these perceptions on reviewer judgment and decisions. Elaboration is a stage of reviewers' judgment and decision-making processes in which the reviewer assesses the strengths and weaknesses of the preparer's work (Petty and Cacioppo 1986; Rich et al. 1997b; Lerner and Tetlock 1999). Although the extent of reviewer elaboration is also affected by expectations about the client and the preparer, extent of elaboration does not explain a significant portion of the effect on reviewer judgment. These findings increase our understanding of how and why expectations of the client and preparer interact to affect reviewer judgments and decisions.

Prior research shows that an audit supervisor’s active intervention in a subordinate’s judgment distorts that judgment. However, subordinates’ judgments are only one input into audit team judgments. How do supervisors finalize audit team judgments after actively intervening in their subordinates’ judgments? In an experiment using audit teams, supervisors with weaker or stronger goals to reach a client-preferred conclusion either were or were not asked to first actively coach a subordinate’s judgment (i.e., active intervention) before reviewing it and finalizing the audit team’s judgment. Supervisors’ intervention influenced subordinates’ inputs, which, in turn, supervisors incorporated into their final judgments. More interestingly, intervention biased supervisors’ final judgments, controlling for supervisor directional goal strength and for concurrent effects on subordinates’ inputs. However, supervisors distorted their judgments less as they perceived a larger technical knowledge advantage over subordinates. In a second experiment, auditors appear aware of the bias-reducing knowledge advantage effects but unaware of the bias-increasing active intervention effects. We discuss implications for audit team judgments and audit quality control.