A new argument for the Basel III leverage ratio requirement is proposed: the need to limit the risk of a bank run when there is imperfect information on the value of a bank’s assets. In addition to screening and monitoring borrowers, banks provide liquidity insurance with the supply of short-term deposits withdrawable on demand. The maturity mismatch creates the risk of a disorderly bank run which can be exacerbated by imperfect information about the value of bank assets. It is shown in a stylized Basel III framework that capital regulation should incorporate a liquidity risk component. Credit risk diversification and/or a reduced probability of loan default which lead to a reduction of Basel III regulatory capital will increase the probability of a bank run. The leverage ratio rule puts a floor on the Basel III risk-weighted capital ratio, allowing the limitation of such a risk.

This paper evaluates the economies of scale and scope in the French mutual funds (SICAV) industry. This segment of the financial sector offers the unique characteristic that some firms specialize, while others supply several products. The results suggest economies of scale and scope for small institutions and diseconomies for larger firms. An appropriate size for a diversified company is in the range of FF 2.9 billion.

This paper evaluates the impact of unexpected inflation on the stock returns of a sample of French banks. It offers an empirical test of theories that have predicted an impact of inflation on the stock returns of banks. The paper complements a large literature that has focused exclusively on the impact of unexpected interest rates. The analysis provides empirical support to the hypothesis that, in periods of volatile inflation, there exists an inflation risk factor which is independent of the well-documented interest rate factor.

Following entry into the European Community in 1986, Portugal transformed rapidly its repressed banking system with deregulation, the opening of borders, the granting of new banking licenses, and privatization. In a more competitive banking system, one would expect a priori an increase in operational efficiency. This paper attempts to quantify the magnitude of efficiency gains over the years 1990–1995. Moreover, the paper documents the relative efficiency performance of new domestic banks. Not hampered by a legacy of inefficiency from the past, they could operate nearer the efficiency frontier. The case of Portugal provides unique information on the joint effect of deregulation and the granting of new banking licenses on the change in operational efficiency of a previously repressed banking system.