In the United States, age at first marriage was lowest and the education gap between husbands and wives was highest during the 1950s. The conventional explanation for such a negative correlation is that early marriage leads to earlier and higher fertility, which in turn prevents women from acquiring education. Here, we propose that early marriages enabled couples to overcome credit constraints in education. A model that includes this motive and mechanism can replicate not only the marriage and education patterns observed in the middle of the century in the United States but also the overall trends over the twentieth century.

This paper uses a policy implemented in Chile that obliges firms to fully fund childcare costs for their female employees, but only if they hire more than 19 women. Using plant level data from manufacturing firms, we first show that this policy has had a substantially detrimental impact on the hiring of women above that threshold, in particular since the policy has become more binding, in industrial sectors that hire fewer women and in larger firms. We then use the response of firms to study whether women workers are more or less complementary to capital than men. We find that firms that avoid the legislation by having just below 20 female workers are significantly more capital intensive than firms just above the threshold. This suggests that firms that want to avoid being subject to the regulation replace women with capital but in such a way that the capital to men ratio increases. We use our estimates to calibrate a production function and find that our results are consistent with a framework where women are weakly substitutes with capital (while men are complementary) in this emerging economy’s manufacturing sector. This does not seem to be driven by a change in skill composition of the workforce. We also find some evidence of other changes: average wages and total workforce are lower for firms who hire 20 women than those who hire just below that threshold but labor productivity is unaltered. PRELIMINARY, PLEASE DO NOT CITE ∗We thank comments from seminar participants at IADB, PUC Chile and Toronto. All remaining errors are our own. †Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile ‡Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile. §Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile and FinanceUC.

Over the last century, resource allocations within families changed significantly, as did marriage matching patterns. College-educated women became more likely to marry (and, to a lesser extent, have children) than less educated women. A large literature documents these patterns and proposes a variety of explanations. We review this literature. Then, we provide a unified empirical framework, which can integrate these mechanisms. We demonstrate the usefulness of that framework by employing it in decennial US censuses and showing that a combination of technological changes that increased the value of children’s education and enabled more educated women to devote more time to child-rearing are consistent with multiple behavioral changes within marriage, on the marriage market, and before marriage.

What explains the growing gap in marriage rates between socioeconomic groups? We present a robust stylized fact not previously documented: marriage rates are higher for individuals with more assets. We argue this may be driven by marriage and cohabitation becoming increasingly similar in a number of ways except for the way assets become marital property to be divided upon divorce in marriage while they remain individual property in the case of cohabitation. We propose that ownership of assets may provide “insurance” to the partner making individually costly, but jointly optimal, investments in children, thus raising the value of marriage.

This paper examines the possibility that a child's years of schooling could increase in the number of siblings, instead of being diminished by competition for parents' resources: if unable to finance the education of their younger children, parents may do so through their older children's labor income. We examine this possibility in a model combining convex returns to education and credit constraints. Our model predicts correlations among family size, years of schooling and birth order, which would not exist when either of these two elements is absent. Empirical patterns shown in the United States, Mexico, and South Korea support the model predictions.

This paper estimates the elasticity of substitution between capital and skill in manufacturing using immigration-induced variation in skill mix across U.S. counties between 1860 and 1930. We find that capital initially complemented both high- and low-skill labor (determined by literacy) and, unlike today, was more complementary with low-skill labor. Around 1890, capital increased its relative complementarity with high-skill labor. Simulations calibrated to our estimates imply the level of capital-skill complementarity after 1890 allowed the manufacturing sector to absorb the large wave of Eastern and Southern European immigrants with only a modest decline in less-skilled relative wages. This would not have been possible under the older production technology.