This paper examines whether mandatory disclosure affects the extent to which firms learn from external market participants. Conventional wisdom suggests that mandatory disclosure should increase the total amount of information in financial markets. However, disclosure can also reduce investors' incentives to acquire and produce information. Using the JOBS Act to identify variations in disclosure requirements, this paper finds that firms with reduced disclosure requirements attract more informed investors and learn more from financial markets than those with stricter disclosure requirements. This learning is concentrated among firms that attract sophisticated investors, particularly those with industry expertise, and weakens once firms are forced to disclose more information. Overall, the results suggest that one benefit from regulators’ recent efforts to reduce U.S. firm disclosure requirements is an increase in firm learning.

We extract and describe corporate-issued guidance contained in over 23,000 LSEG Guidance Reports of S&P 1,500 firms from 2005 to 2021. Our sample contains 1.735 million Guidance Reports guidance instances that span over 180 guided items and fall into three broad categories: (1) qualitative topics, (2) consolidated financial statements, and (3) other key performance indicators. We identify research opportunities arising from Guidance Reports’ rich features, including quantitative or qualitative form, underpinning text, disclosure channels, and source speakers. We also compare Guidance Reports to the commonly used I/B/E/S Guidance database, which covers only quantitative guidance for 13 items. Approximately 1.494 million Guidance Reports instances fall outside I/B/E/S Guidance’s coverage, and even among overlapping items, only a subset is translated to I/B/E/S Guidance based on LSEG cost–benefit considerations. Our findings suggest researchers should be aware of the extent and nature of I/B/E/S Guidance omissions when studying guidance.

This study examines whether weakening employee non‐disclosure agreements (NDAs) affects the flow of information to capital markets via the business press. After state laws weakened NDAs related to misconduct, treated firms exhibit a significant increase in corporate news relative to control firms. The increase is driven by non‐financial news, particularly about legal issues and corporate social responsibility. Articles become significantly more negative in tone and generate stronger market reactions, indicating that employees increasingly share informative negative information with journalists. Further, we document increased interactions between employees and journalists, with more articles citing employees as sources. Our evidence suggests that employees are an important source of corporate information for journalists and that blanket NDAs can impede this channel. Overall, the study highlights an important trade‐off between protecting firms' confidential information and preserving transparency. Our findings suggest that boards, executives, and regulators should design employment confidentiality policies that protect legitimate proprietary information without suppressing the disclosure of misconduct that is important for market discipline and governance.

We examine broad effects of MiFID II, which mandated unbundled pricing of analyst research in the European Union beginning in 2018. We find significant reductions in sell-side analyst following, particularly for firms for which the marginal analyst was less important (larger, older, less volatile firms with greater coverage and more accurate forecasts). High quality analysts (more accurate, experienced, and in positions of seniority) were more likely to leave the sell-side and move to the buy-side, while remaining sell-side analysts increased efforts to make their forecasts more informative (more accurate, more detailed, and more likely to include informative recommendations resulting in larger stock price responses). Firms responded to a loss of sell-side coverage with more frequent, forward-looking, and informative investor relations events, especially for firms that lost the most coverage. Our results support recent theoretical analysis predicting that unbundling had significant implications for sell-side research, buy-side research, and firm responses.

This paper examines how a change in disclosure regulation influences investors' information acquisition and trading across multiple markets. We leverage the 2007 elimination of the Form 20‐F reconciliation requirement for cross‐listed firms that prepare financial statements under IFRS. Using a difference‐in‐differences research design, we show that investors acquire fewer Form 20‐Fs of IFRS‐reporting cross‐listed firms when these forms are not filed in a timely manner relative to the home‐country earnings announcement. We also find an increased acquisition of earnings‐specific 6‐Ks, indicating a shift in investor attention from delayed and unreconciled 20‐Fs to more timely earnings releases in the home country. Furthermore, we find that American Depositary Receipt (ADR) market reactions to local earnings announcements increase after the deregulation, especially for firms with strong home‐country institutions. In addition, we find that the deregulation increases return co‐movement between the US ADR market and the home‐country stock market for IFRS filers' shares. Our results bring novel insights regarding the cross‐market impact of the disclosure regulation change.