[We find a positive association between short selling and accruals during 1988—2009, and that asymmetry between the up- and downsides of the accrual anomaly is stronger when constraints on short arbitrage are more severe (low availability of loanable shares as proxied by institutional holdings). Short arbitrage occurs primarily among firms in the top accrual decile. Asymmetry is present only on NASDAQ. Thus, there is short arbitrage of the accrual anomaly, but short-sale constraints limit its effectiveness.]

Despite the unquestionable influence of conservatism, disagreement remains about what economic demands lead to financial reporting conservatism. Research examining lenders’ demands for reporting conservatism has been questioned for ignoring conservative contract modifications. We document that these modifications exist but are not ubiquitous. We find contract modifications are more likely when agency costs are higher and litigation, tax and equity demands for conservatism are lower. However, we find a positive association between unexplained reporting conservatism and contract modifications, suggesting contractual modifications alone do not fulfill lenders’ demands for conservatism.

In this paper, we address two questions that emerged in the aftermath of the 2008 financial/banking crisis. First, did the financial statements of bank holding companies provide an early warning of their impending distress? Second, were the actions of four key financial intermediaries (short sellers, equity analysts, Standard and Poor's credit ratings, and auditors) sensitive to the information in the banks’ financial statements about their increased risk and potential distress? We find a significant cross‐sectional association between banks’ 2006 Q4 financial information and bank failures over 2008–2010, suggesting that the financial statements reflected at least some of the increased risk of bank distress in advance. The mean abnormal short interest in our sample of banks increased from 0.66 percent in March 2005 to 2.4 percent in March 2007 and the association between short interest and leading financial statement indicators also increased. In contrast, we observe neither a meaningful change in analysts’ recommendations, Standard and Poor's credit ratings, and audit fees nor an increased sensitivity of these actions to financial indicators of bank distress over this time period. Our results suggest that actions of short sellers likely provided an early warning of the banks’ upcoming distress prior to the 2008 financial crisis.

We investigate how high-profile accounting frauds affect peer firms' investment. We document that peers react to the fraudulent reports by increasing investment during fraud periods. We show that this finding is not driven by frauds that have a higher ex ante likelihood of detection or by an association between fraud and investment booms. In addition, we find that peers’ investments increase in fraudulent earnings overstatements, and in industries with higher investor sentiment, lower cost of capital and higher private benefits of control. We also find evidence consistent with equity analysts potentially facilitating the spillover effect.