[This article investigates the effects of mortgage-backed security (MBS) hedging activity on interest rate volatility and proposes a model that takes these effects into account. An empirical examination suggests that the inclusion of information about MBSs considerably improves model performance in pricing interest rate options and in forecasting future interest rate volatility. The empirical results are consistent with the hypothesis that MBS hedging affects the interest rate volatility implied by both options and the actual interest rate volatility. The results also indicate that the inclusion of information about the MBS universe may result in models that better describe the price of fixed-income securities.]

Dai and Singleton (2002) and Duffee (2002) show that there is a tension in affine term structure models between matching the mean and the volatility of interest rates. This article examines whether this tension can be solved by an alternative parametrization of the price of risk. The empirical evidence suggests that, first, the examined parametrization is not sufficient to solve the mean-volatility tension. Second, the usual result in the estimation of affine models, indicating that some of the state variables are extremely persistent, may have been caused by the lack of flexibility in the parametrization of the price of risk.

[Although it is well known that appearance-based impressions affect labor market and election outcomes, little is known about the role appearance plays in financial transactions. We address this question using photographs of potential borrowers from a peer-to-peer lending site. Consistent with the trust-intensive nature of lending, we find that borrowers who appear more trustworthy have higher probabilities of having their loans funded. Moreover, borrowers who appear more trustworthy indeed have better credit scores and default less often. Overall, our findings suggest that impressions of trustworthiness matter in financial transactions as they predict investor, as well as borrower, behavior.]

This article investigates the effects of mortgage-backed security (MBS) hedging activity on interest rate volatility and proposes a model that takes these effects into account. An empirical examination suggests that the inclusion of information about MBSs considerably improves model performance in pricing interest rate options and in forecasting future interest rate volatility. The empirical results are consistent with the hypothesis that MBS hedging affects the interest rate volatility implied by both options and the actual interest rate volatility. The results also indicate that the inclusion of information about the MBS universe may result in models that better describe the price of fixed-income securities. The Author 2007. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: [email protected], Oxford University Press.

Dai and Singleton (2002) and Duffee (2002) show that there is a tension in affine term structure models between matching the mean and the volatility of interest rates. This article examines whether this tension can be solved by an alternative parametrization of the price of risk. The empirical evidence suggests that, first, the examined parametrization is not sufficient to solve the mean-volatility tension. Second, the usual result in the estimation of affine models, indicating that some of the state variables are extremely persistent, may have been caused by the lack of flexibility in the parametrization of the price of risk.

[We conduct an analysis of the risk and return characteristics of a number of widely used fixed-income arbitrage strategies. We find that the strategies requiring more "intellectual capital" to implement tend to produce significant alphas after controlling for bond and equity market risk factors. These positive alphas remain significant even after taking into account typical hedge fund fees. In contrast with other hedge fund strategies, many of the fixed-income arbitrage strategies produce positively skewed returns. These results suggest that there may be more economic substance to fixedincome arbitrage than simply "picking up nickels in front of a steamroller."]

We show that a simple, intuitive variable, Goliath versus David (GVD), reflects time variation in discount rates related to changes in aggregate business conditions. GVD is the annual change in the weight of the largest 250 firms in the aggregate stock market and is motivated by research that shows that small firms are more severely impacted than large firms by economic shocks due to differences in access to external finance. We find that GVD is the best single predictor of out-of-sample market returns among traditional predictors, predicting quarterly market returns with an out-of-sample R 2 of 6.3% in the 1976–2011 evaluation period.

We show that the PIN and the Duarte and Young (2009) (APIN) models do not match the variability of noise trade in the data and that this limitation has severe implications for how these models identify private information. We examine two alternatives to these models, the Generalized PIN model (GPIN) and the Odders-White and Ready (2008) model (OWR). Our tests indicate that measures of private information based on the OWR and GPIN models are promising alternatives to the APIN’s Adj.PIN and PIN.

We conduct an analysis of the risk and return characteristics of a number of widely used fixed-income arbitrage strategies. We find that the strategies requiring more “intellectual capital” to implement tend to produce significant alphas after controlling for bond and equity market risk factors. These positive alphas remain significant even after taking into account typical hedge fund fees. In contrast with other hedge fund strategies, many of the fixed-income arbitrage strategies produce positively skewed returns. These results suggest that there may be more economic substance to fixed-income arbitrage than simply “picking up nickels in front of a steamroller.”

Existing evidence suggests that the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) may be beneficial to US investors, but that foreign firms are perhaps less likely to list in the USA after SOX. This raises the question of whether foreign firms avoid listing in the USA after SOX because the Act imposes unnecessary costs upon firms. The objective of this article is to reconcile the US and international evidence by distinguishing between the effect of SOX on controlling shareholders and managers of foreign firms and the effect on minority investors of these firms. Our results suggest that insiders of foreign firms believe that the regulation makes the extraction of value from minority investors more difficult and costly for them. Outside investors in foreign firms, on the other hand, seem on average to believe that SOX is beneficial to them. The combination of these results reconciles the existing US and international evidence regarding SOX.