This study examines whether religiosity at the county level is associated with future stock price crash risk. We find robust evidence that firms headquartered in counties with higher levels of religiosity exhibit lower levels of future stock price crash risk. This finding is consistent with the view that religion, as a set of social norms, helps to curb bad-news-hoarding activities by managers. Our evidence further shows that the negative relation between religiosity and future crash risk is stronger for riskier firms and for firms with weaker governance mechanisms measured by shareholder takeover rights and dedicated institutional ownership.

Using a large sample of U.S. public firms, we find robust evidence that short interest is positively related to one-year ahead stock price crash risk. The evidence is consistent with the view that short sellers are able to detect bad news hoarding by managers. Additional findings show that the positive relation between short interest and future crash risk is more salient for firms with weak governance mechanisms, excessive risk-taking behavior, and high information asymmetry between managers and shareholders. Empirical support is provided showing that the relation between short interest and crash risk is driven by bad news hoarding.

This study examines the relation between performance covenants in private debt contracting and conservative accounting under adverse selection. We find that under severe adverse selection (i.e., high information asymmetry), accounting conservatism and performance covenants act as complements to signal that the borrower is unlikely to appropriate wealth from the lender. No such relation obtains in a low information asymmetry regime. We further show that in the high information asymmetry regime, borrowers with high levels of conservatism and tight performance covenants generally enjoy lower interest rate spreads than borrowers with low levels of conservatism and loose performance covenants. Consistent with our signaling theory, in the high information asymmetry regime, borrowers with high levels of conservatism and tight performance covenants are less likely to make abnormal payouts to shareholders. Our empirical results are robust to alternative measures of conservatism and covenant restrictiveness.