This paper examines whether investors chase hedge fund investment styles. We find that better-performing and more popular styles are rewarded with higher inflows in subsequent periods. This indicates that investors compare hedge fund styles in terms of recent performance and popularity, and they subsequently reallocate funds from less successful to more successful styles. Furthermore, we find evidence of competition between individual hedge funds of the same style. Funds outperforming the other funds in their styles and funds whose inflows exceed the average flows in their styles experience higher inflows in subsequent periods. One of the reasons for competition among same-style funds is investors’ search for the best managers. The high minimum investment required to invest in a hedge fund limits investors’ diversification opportunities and makes this search particularly important. Finally, we show that hedge fund investors’ implementation of style chasing in combination with intra-style fund selection represents a smart strategy.

A wide range of empirical biases hampers hedge fund databases. In this paper we focus upon survival-related biases and disentangle look-ahead biases due to self-selection of funds and due to fund termination. Self-selection arises because funds voluntarily report their information to data vendors and may decide to stop doing so. By extending existing methodology, we analyze persistence in hedge fund performance over the period 1994–2000, taking into account the above biases. The results show that look-ahead biases due to liquidation and self-selection enforce each other and may lead to overestimating expected returns by as much as 8% per year. Overall, the results are consistent with positive persistence in hedge fund returns at horizons of two and four quarters.

This paper analyzes the properties of a number of estimators that can be used to estimate short-run persistence in mutual fund returns. When data for different funds are pooled, it is advisable to correct for cross-sectional differences in expected returns. However, these adjustments may induce biases in the estimated persistence coefficients and thus lead to spurious persistence. Theoretical derivations, combined with a Monte Carlo study, show that these biases cannot be neglected for the samples that are typically used in applied work. We also estimate the short-run persistence in two samples of U.S. open-end mutual funds using quarterly returns for 1987–1994. An important conclusion is that the results are quite sensitive to the estimation method that is employed.

We study the money flows into and out of socially responsible investment (SRI) funds around the world. In their investment decisions, investors in SRI funds may be more concerned with ethical or social issues than with fund performance. Therefore, SRI money flows are less related to past fund returns. Ethical money is less sensitive to past negative returns than are conventional fund flows, especially when SRI funds primarily use negative or Sin/Ethical screens. Social attributes of SRI funds weaken the relation between money inflows and past positive returns. However, money flows into funds with environmental screens are more sensitive to past positive returns than are conventional fund flows. Stock picking based on in-house SRI research increases the money flows. These results give evidence on the role of nonfinancial attributes, which induce heterogeneity of investor clienteles within SRI funds. We find no evidence of a smart money effect, as the funds that receive more inflows neither outperform nor underperform their benchmarks or conventional funds.

Do investors pay a price for investing in socially responsible investments (SRI) funds, or do they obtain superior returns? This paper investigates these under- and overperformance hypotheses for all SRI funds across the world. Consistent with investors paying a price for ethics, SRI funds in the US, the UK, and in many continental European and Asia-Pacific countries underperform their domestic benchmarks by −2.2% to −6.5%. However, with the exception of some countries such as France, Japan and Sweden, the risk-adjusted returns of SRI funds are not statistically different from the performance of conventional funds. We also find that the underperformance of SRI funds is not driven by loadings on an ethics style factor. There is mixed evidence of a smart money effect: SRI investors are unable to identify the funds that will outperform in the future, whereas they show some fund-selection ability in identifying funds that will perform poorly. Finally, corporate governance and social screens yield lower risk-adjusted returns.

We analyze the performance persistence in hedge funds taking into account look-ahead bias (multi-period sampling bias). We model liquidation of hedge funds by analyzing how it depends upon historical performance. Next, we use a weighting procedure that eliminates look-ahead bias in measures for performance persistence. In contrast to earlier results for mutual funds, the impact of look-ahead bias is exacerbated for hedge funds due to their greater level of total risk. At the four-quarter horizon, look-ahead bias can be as much as 3.8%, depending upon the decile of the distribution. We find positive persistence in hedge fund quarterly returns after correcting for investment style. The empirical pattern at the annual level is also consistent with positive persistence, but its statistical significance is weak.

The segmentation of the socially responsible investing (SRI) movement with a values-versus-profit orientation solves the puzzling evidence that both socially responsible and controversial stocks produce superior returns. We derive that the segment of values-driven investors primarily uses “negative” screens to avoid controversial stocks, while the profit-driven segment uses “positive” screens. As the result of an empirical analysis over the period 1992–2008, we base our segmentation on investment screens that help us to examine whether values affect prices. We find that, although the profit-driven segment earns abnormal returns in the short run, these profit-generating opportunities do not persist in the long run for SRI stocks. However, our conclusions highlight the observation that different views on SRI can be complementary in the short run.

This paper provides a critical review of the literature on socially responsible investments (SRI). Particular to SRI is that both financial goals and social objectives are pursued. Over the past decade, SRI has experienced an explosive growth around the world reflecting the increasing awareness of investors to social, environmental, ethical and corporate governance issues. We argue that there are significant opportunities for future research on the increasingly important area of SRI. A number of questions are reviewed in this paper on the causes and the shareholder-value impact of corporate social responsibility (CSR), the risk exposure and performance of SRI funds and firms, as well as fund subscription and redemption behavior of SRI investors. We conclude that the existing studies hint but do not unequivocally demonstrate that SRI investors are willing to accept suboptimal financial performance to pursue social or ethical objectives. Furthermore, the emergence of SRI raises interesting questions for research on corporate finance, asset pricing, and financial intermediation.

We study the economic significance of social dimensions in investment decisions by analyzing the holdings of U.S. equity mutual funds over the period 2004–2012. Using these holdings, we measure funds’ exposures to socially sensitive stocks in order to answer two questions. What explains cross-sectional variation in mutual funds’ exposure to controversial companies? Does exposure to controversial stocks drive fund returns? We find that exposures to socially sensitive stocks are weaker for funds that aim to attract socially conscious and institutional investor clientele, and they relate to local political and religious factors. The financial payoff associated with greater “sin” stock exposure is positive and statistically significant, but becomes non-significant with broader definitions of socially sensitive investments. Despite the positive relation between mutual fund return and sin stock exposure, the annualized risk-adjusted return spread between a portfolio of funds with highest sin stock exposure and its lowest-ranked counterpart is statistically not significant. The results suggest that fund managers do not tilt heavily towards controversial stocks because of social considerations and practical constraints.

Little is known about how different bonus schemes affect traders' propensity to trade and which bonus schemes improve traders' performance. We study the effects of linear versus threshold bonus schemes on traders' behavior. Traders buy and sell shares in an experimental stock market on the basis of fundamental and technical information (past share price evolution, realized earnings, analysts' earnings forecasts, and evolution of the market index). We find that linear and threshold bonus schemes have different effects on trading behavior: traders make more transactions but of a smaller size under the threshold than under the linear bonus scheme. Furthermore, transaction frequency significantly decreases when bonus thresholds are reached but only after building in a safety margin. Under the threshold scheme, the traders' performance is lower (even when there are no transaction costs) than under the linear bonus scheme as a consequence of poorer market timing. This is especially the case when earning money by trading is relatively difficult (i.e., under low profitability conditions). Nevertheless, under low profitability conditions, traders seem to collect more information about the relationships between share price and market returns, earnings, and earnings forecasts, put more effort into understanding those relationships, and thus eventually learn to perform better.