This paper examines the role of buyer–supplier relationships on suppliers' financial constraints. Buyers are non-financial stakeholders with both the ability and incentive to monitor their supplier and act as a certifying agent. This mitigates agency costs, reducing the wedge between the costs of internal and external funds resulting in lower investment–cash flow sensitivity and lower cash–cash flow sensitivity. I provide empirical evidence for this effect. The results highlight the importance of understanding buyer–supplier relationships when evaluating a firm's financing and investment policy.

If one customer accounts for a large portion of a supplier's sales, then the loss of that one customer can cripple the supplier's financial health. As a precaution against the additional operating risk induced by being in an important relationship with a customer, I find that suppliers in such relationships hold more cash on average than suppliers that are not in important relationships. Additionally, supplier's cash holdings increase proportionately with the importance of their customer relationships. Being in an important relationship affects cash holdings and leverage differently, indicating that firms manage cash and debt for different purposes. I find that suppliers in relationships primarily accrue cash through issuance of stock as opposed to debt or retained earnings. The results highlight the importance of understanding buyer–supplier relationships when evaluating a firm's financing policy.

Psychological research suggests that individuals are satisficers. That is, when confronted with a large number of options, individuals often choose the first acceptable option, rather than the best possible option ( Simon, 1957 ). Given the vast quantity of information available and the widespread convention of listing stocks in alphabetical order, we conjecture that investors are more likely to buy and sell stocks with early alphabet names. Consistent with this view, we find that early alphabet stocks are traded more frequently than later alphabet stocks and that alphabeticity also affects firm value. We also document how these effects have changed over time.

This paper examines the ability of firms to overcome cross-country barriers to borrowing through foreign asset connections. We find that firm-level foreign assets are an important mechanism in reducing the boundary between borrowers and lenders and thereby enhancing capital access in the syndicated loan market. Our results suggest that firms with foreign assets are more likely to select a foreign lead lender and that the corresponding loans have better pricing terms. And, more specifically, we find that the location of the foreign assets strongly predicts the foreign lender's location. These results support the hypothesis that foreign presence helps reduce information barriers that arise across borders.