We examine the decision of a firm to go public abroad and list securities outside their country of origin. Foreign IPO issuers are more likely to choose a global underwriter but only if the home country is less financially integrated. We find that the probability of conducting a foreign IPO is higher if the home country has a less developed stock market, its disclosure regime is weaker and is less financially integrated. Using a matched sample, we show that foreign IPOs raise more capital than their domestic counterparts. Finally, the determinants of the choice of a US listing are unique. Our results suggest that the rise of global underwriters facilitates the movement of capital across nations and contributes to world financial globalization.

We show that the allocation of managerial ownership to individuals within firms varies depending upon the joint distribution of decision control and decision management rights. Using a unique dataset of institutional investment management firms, we show that ownership is higher for managers: with both executive and operational responsibilities; when benefits of cooperation are higher; and with large contributions to firm value. Consistent with career concerns, we find increases in a manager's ownership are associated with increases in unsystematic risk. Ownership dispersion within the firm is associated with the allocation of monitoring and operational roles and the potential benefits of cooperation.

We use survey responses from 2,901 corporate insiders to assess the costs and benefits of compliance with Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The majority of respondents recognize compliance benefits, but they do not perceive these benefits to outweigh the costs, on average. This is particularly true among smaller companies where the start-up costs are proportionately larger. However, the perceived efficiency of compliance increases with auditor attestations, years of compliance experience, and after the remediation of a material weakness. Notably, the perceived effects of compliance depend largely on firm complexity, but are mostly unrelated to firm governance structure.