In this study I use an experiment to examine why auditors are more likely to issue going–concern opinions when the client has been the subject of negative press coverage prior to the date of the audit opinion. I find no evidence that negative press coverage increases auditors’ perceptions of legal liability, as was suggested in the prior literature. I do find, however, that negative press coverage increases auditors’ perception of a client's bankruptcy probability and this, in turn, leads auditors to modify the audit opinion. Because the press coverage presented in this study provides no new information, the results suggest that auditors react too strongly to redundant information. This over–reaction can result in inefficient allocation of audit resources and can have deleterious affects on clients. Accordingly, policy makers, auditors and their clients might be interested in how auditors’ reliance on redundant information can be reduced.

This essay is based on my plenary address at the 105th Annual Meeting of the American Accounting Association (AAA). I am honored to have been selected as the AAA 2021 Presidential Scholar. This essay represents a call to action. I invite my fellow accounting professors to fulfill our stated mission and shared values to be thought leaders in accounting. I present ideas and suggestions on how we can lead our students, our academic institutions, and the accounting profession in supporting a prosperous and just society.

We analyze the impact of the press on the behavior of various economic agents by examining how media exposure of board ineffectiveness affects corporate governance, investor trading behavior, and security prices. Our focus on board quality is motivated by the strong media criticism to which corporate boards and corporate America, in general, have been recently subjected. The results indicate that media releases of (noisy) information have significant economic consequences. In particular, media exposure of board ineffectiveness forces the targeted agents to take corrective actions and enhances shareholder wealth. Individual investors appear to react negatively to the media exposure, whereas investment firms act as if they anticipate the targeted firms’ corrective actions.

We provide evidence that regulatory guidance aimed at improving audit efficiency and effectiveness—allowing auditor reliance on a multi‐location client's competent and objective internal audit function (IAF)—can unintentionally increase auditors' litigation risk. Our research is important in demonstrating how client characteristics and juror cognitive processing, such as the number of client locations and jurors' susceptibility to the numerosity heuristic, factors beyond auditors' control, can exacerbate their litigation exposure. Consistent with theoretical predictions, we find that susceptibility to the numerosity heuristic contributes to jurors assessing an increased likelihood of misstatement on multi‐location compared to single‐location audits. Furthermore, these assessments of higher misstatement risk on multi‐location audits lead jurors to perceive that auditor reliance on the client's IAF in multi‐location audits is less appropriate (i.e., not normal). Accordingly, jurors judge that auditors are more negligent when they rely on the IAF during multi‐location audits than when they do not, but IAF reliance does not impact auditor negligence on single‐location audits. Our results suggest auditor reluctance to use a qualified IAF, despite client pressure and regulatory allowance, can provide potential benefits to firms in terms of reduced litigation exposure. Thus, we demonstrate the legal regime can undermine the objectives of regulators' guidance to enhance audit efficiency and corporate governance.

We investigate the joint effects of auditors' reporting choice and audit committee effectiveness on management disclosures about complex estimates. A new PCAOB standard requires auditors to report on Critical Audit Matters (CAMs): issues “communicated or required to be communicated to the audit committee” about accounts or disclosures that (1) “are material to the financial statements,” and (2) “involved especially challenging, subjective, or complex auditor judgment” (PCAOB 2017a, 11). Consistent with investor arguments, we find that audit committee effectiveness and more detailed CAM reporting encourage managers' disclosures of the risk underlying complex estimates. When the auditor's report is more informative about a complex estimate and the audit committee is more effective, management's related financial disclosures are more forthcoming. However, less informative auditor disclosures or more effective audit committees alone do not prompt greater management disclosure. Thus, expanded auditor reporting and more effective audit committees, together, can enhance the disclosures investors value.

Research documents significant management bias and opportunism around the discretionary inputs of audited complex estimates, including fair value measurements (FVMs), which raises questions about auditors' ability to test these estimates. We examine how the degree of quantification in client evidence and client control environment risk influence auditors' planned substantive testing of management's discretionary inputs to FVMs. We find that auditors allocate a lower proportion of effort to testing the subjective inputs to the fair value estimate when the degree of quantification in the client evidence and level of client risk are both high. Further, this tendency persists even after auditors receive a regulatory practice alert reminding them to focus more audit effort on testing fair value (FV) inputs that are susceptible to management bias, and despite the auditors increasing their overall audit effort. Qualitative analyses of the procedures auditors selected indicate that inapt attention to the degree of quantification in evidence is a potential root cause of the difficulty auditors encounter when testing complex estimates. Our results imply that in situations where both quantified and non-quantified data are important to the audit, there is the potential for management to manipulate the evidence they provide to auditors to distract auditors from testing the discretionary inputs to complex estimates that are susceptible to management opportunism. Data Availability: Contact authors for data availability.

Auditors often receive summary information or conclusions from management about account balances or internal controls. They must then gather evidence to assess whether this information is fairly stated. In such situations, management can be considered the “first mover” and the auditor the “second mover.” When auditors are the second mover, they are vulnerable to the curse of knowledge bias—the inability to ignore previously processed information (Fischhoff 1977). Specifically, because information from management could be incorrect or biased, auditors must arrive at an independent evaluation of the item in question (e.g., year-end book values, accounting estimates, or internal controls). This study examines the general issue of auditors being “second movers” by investigating how their awareness of management’s severity classifications of internal control problems influences auditors’ initial assessments of internal control over financial reporting (ICFR) under Auditing Standard No. 2. Our experimental design allows us to determine that management’s “first mover” influence on auditors’ judgments is an unintentional cognitive effect, rather than an intentional use of management’s classifications. We further examine whether cognitively restructuring the ICFR assessment task reduces management’s influence on auditors’ judgments by asking auditors to evaluate and explicitly document the likelihood and magnitude of the effect of an ICFR problem on the financial statements. We find that cognitively restructuring the task mitigates management’s “first mover” influence on auditors’ judgments.