We examine the impact of managerial ability on the shareholder tax sensitivity of dividends. We find that managerial ability increases the sensitivity of dividends to the dividend tax penalty. In addition, the positive association between managerial ability and the shareholder tax sensitivity of dividends decreases in institutional ownership. Further, managerial ability increases the shareholder tax sensitivity of the substitution of dividends with share repurchases. Finally, evidence from tax reforms reveals that high ability managers are more responsive to a reduction in dividend tax penalty than to an increase. We conclude that managerial ability influences the formation of tax-efficient dividend policies.

We examine whether and how language barriers influence a country’s decision to adopt International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Our findings reveal that as the distance between a country’s official language and English (i.e., linguistic distance) increases, the likelihood and speed of a country adopting IFRS decrease. Our evidence is consistent with the notion that language barriers impose significant information costs on preparers and users of financial reporting, making IFRS costlier to adopt for countries with severe language barriers. In further analysis, we find that such information costs materialize when these countries eventually adopt IFRS. Specifically, firms in countries with the most severe language barriers experience a worsened post-adoption information environment, as evidenced by increased analyst forecast errors and widened bid-ask spreads. Overall our study suggests that language barriers impede achievement of international accounting harmonization by increasing the costs associated with adopting, understanding, and applying IFRS.