Using a large sample of U.S. firms during 1964–2007, we find that conditional conservatism is associated with a lower likelihood of a firm's future stock price crashes. This finding holds for multiple measures of conditional conservatism and crash risk and is robust to controlling for other known determinants of crash risk and firm‐fixed effects. Moreover, we find that the relation between conservatism and crash risk is more pronounced for firms with higher information asymmetry. Overall, our results are consistent with the notion that conditional conservatism limits managers’ incentive and ability to overstate performance and hide bad news from investors, which, in turn, reduces stock price crash risk.

The recent financial crisis has stimulated a renewed interest in understanding the determinants of stock price crash risk (i.e., left tail risk). Recent research shows that opaque financial reports enable managers to hide and accumulate bad news for extended periods. When the accumulated bad news reaches a certain tipping point, it will be suddenly released to the market at once, resulting in an abrupt decline in stock price (i.e., a crash). This study extends this line of research by examining the impact of financial reporting opacity on perceived or expected crash risk. Prominent economists, such as Olivier Blanchard, argue that removing the perception of tail risks (in addition to realized tail risks) is crucial in restoring investor confidence and stabilizing the stock market. Using the steepness of option implied volatility skew as a proxy for perceived crash risk, we find that accrual management, the presence of financial statement restatements, and auditor‐attested internal control weakness are all positively and significantly associated with the level of perceived crash risk. Our results suggest that improving financial reporting transparency is an important mechanism for firms and policymakers to reduce the perception of tail risks and stabilize the stock market.

Using a large sample of both publicly traded and privately held firms in South Korea (hereafter “Korea”), we investigate whether, and how, the deviation of controlling shareholders' control from ownership, business group affiliation, and listing status differentially affect the extent of earnings management. Our study yields three major findings. First, we find that as the control‐ownership disparity becomes larger, controlling shareholders tend to engage more in opportunistic earnings management to hide their behavior and avoid adverse consequences such as disciplinary action. The result of our full‐model regression reveals that an increase in the control‐ownership wedge by 1 percent leads to an increase in the magnitude of (unsigned) discretionary accruals by 1.3 percent of lagged total assets, ceteris paribus. Second, we find that for our full‐model regression, the magnitude of (unsigned) discretionary accruals is greater for group‐affiliated firms than for nonaffiliated firms by 0.8 percent of lagged total assets. This result suggests that business group affiliation provides controlling shareholders with more incentives and opportunities for earnings management. Finally, we find that for our full‐model regression, the magnitude of (unsigned) discretionary accruals is greater for publicly traded firms than for privately held firms by 1.2 percent of lagged total assets. This result supports the notion that stock markets create incentives for public firms to manage reported earnings to satisfy the expectations of various market participants that are often expressed in earnings numbers.

In this paper, we investigate whether, and how, audit effectiveness differentiation between Big 6 and non‐Big 6 auditors is influenced by a conflict or convergence of reporting incentives faced by corporate managers and external auditors. In so doing, we incorporate into our analysis the possibility that managers self‐select both external auditors and discretionary accruals, using the two stage “treatment effects” model. Our results show that only when managers have incentives to prefer income‐increasing accrual choices are Big 6 auditors more effective than non‐Big 6 auditors in deterring/monitoring opportunistic earnings management. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we find Big 6 auditors are less effective than non‐Big 6 auditors when both managers and auditors have incentives to prefer income‐decreasing accrual choices and thus no conflict of reporting incentives exists between the two parties. The above findings are robust to different proxies for opportunistic earnings management and different proxies for the direction of earnings management incentives.

We examine the relation between earnings smoothing and stock price crash risk to evaluate the role of earnings smoothing on the downside risk of equity values. We find that, within firm, a higher degree of earnings smoothing is associated with greater crash risk; and this association, in the cross-section, is more pronounced for firms with fewer analysts following, smaller institutional holdings, and positive cumulative discretionary accruals. We also use stock returns to assess the economic significance of our results. We find that, controlling for firm fixed effects, earnings smoothing is associated with sizable negative returns in the quarter following the earnings announcement. Our findings caution investors about the downside risk of firms reporting smooth earnings, in contrast to the conventional belief that these firms are low in equity risk.

Investment institutions with substantial shareholdings in a firm have the resources and incentives to monitor and influence management decisions. Whether the institutions actually monitor and exert pressure on managers is an empirical question. Previous studies have reported mixed results on this question. We examine whether large institutional shareholdings in a firm deter earnings management by its managers when those executives otherwise have incentives to increase or decrease reported profits. Using discretionary accounting accruals as the measure of earnings management, we find that the presence of large institutional shareholdings inhibit managers from increasing or decreasing reported profits towards the managers' desired level or range of profits. The evidence is consistent with institutional investors monitoring and constraining the self-serving behavior of corporate managers.

Unlike prior research that focuses on determinants of firm-specific stock price crashes (SPCs), we study the consequences of SPCs on market information efficiency. The tension underlying our research question stems from two competing explanations. As an unanticipated shock, an SPC could stimulate (distort) information efficiency by triggering investor rational attention (opinion divergence). Our identification strategy involves a difference-in-differences analysis in which SPC firms in the treatment sample are propensity score matched with non-SPC firms in the industry-peer control sample, as well as placebo tests for falsification. Consistent with the stimulation effect, we find an increase of the earnings response coefficient and a decrease in post-earnings announcement drift, from the pre- to post-SPC period, for SPC firms, but not for non-SPC firms. Further analyses reveal that SPC firms attract increased investor attention, as reflected in greater analyst coverage and more investor access to firms' online financial filings following such an event. Using mutual fund flow redemption pressure based on hypothetical sales as an exogenous shock to SPCs, we provide evidence corroborating our causal interpretation of the main findings. Collectively, the evidence suggests that SPCs can attract increased investor attention, bringing about positive externalities by stimulating market information efficiency.