Although q2 measures how well a pattern of means fits a custom contrast, there is no guidance for what values are “good.” We survey experimental accounting researchers who assess the fit between plots of means and contrast weights as poor, acceptable, good, or excellent. We find that graphical presentation effects and researchers’ individual attributes influence their assessments. This suggests that research needs an ex ante method for evaluating q2, grounded empirically in the wisdom of the crowd across many different presentations, rather than relying solely on the idiosyncratic assessments of individual researchers. Using fuzzy set theory, we develop such a method that researchers can use to characterize q2 = 0.100, for example, as mostly good fit, leaning toward acceptable. Our approach has significant advantages over bright-line cutoffs commonly used for other statistical indices. Overall, our study can improve our discipline’s assessments of fit between experimental results and custom contrast weights. Data Availability: Data are available from the authors upon request.

Informed by Perceptual Deterrence Theory, we conduct multiple experiments to investigate when and how auditor actions can help deter manager opportunism. In Study 1A, we find that managers are less likely to use real earnings management (REM) when they expect auditors to both increase scrutiny and communicate their observations to the board. However, this effect occurs only when managers' operational decisions are inconsistent (versus consistent) with peer behavior. Study 1B findings suggest that increased auditor scrutiny alone (without auditor-board communication) is not likely to deter REM. In Study 2, we find that increased auditor scrutiny with communication to the board effectively deters both accruals-based earnings management (AEM) and REM, reducing the total level of manager opportunism. However, without communication, increased auditor scrutiny deters AEM, but also induces more REM. Our findings highlight the importance of auditor-board communication and demonstrate how auditor actions can contribute to the deterrence of manager opportunism. Data Availability: Contact the authors.