This paper shows that the bootstrap does not consistently estimate the asymptotic distribution of the maximum score estimator. The theory developed also applies to other estimators within a cube-root convergence class. For some single-parameter estimators in this class, the results suggest a simple method for inference based upon the bootstrap.

Given the frequency and value implications of post-IPO merger and acquisition activity, we investigate empirically whether investors can utilize information based on IPO deal structure to predict merger and acquisition activity among newly public firms. Consistent with the hypothesis that some firms conduct IPOs to facilitate future M&A activity, we find that aspects of IPO deal structure predict whether a newly public firm subsequently becomes a bidder or target. These characteristics include underwriter quality, promotional activity, pricing, proceeds, ownership structure, and issuance activity suggestive of market timing. Investors appear to rely on these observable aspects of a firm's going public process to anticipate the implications of M&A activity for security valuation. Specifically, when newly public firms with IPO deal structures predictive of acquisition activity announce an acquisition their stock returns are indistinguishable from zero. In contrast, abnormal returns to acquisition announcements by unlikely or surprise bidders are positive on average. These results suggest that the going public process has important implications for future M&A activity and valuation.

We evaluate the link between chief executive officer (CEO) industry tournament incentives (ITIs) and the product-market benefits of corporate liquidity. We find that ITIs increase the level and marginal value of cash holdings. Furthermore, ITIs strengthen the relation between excess cash and market-share gains, especially for firms that face significant competitive threats. Additionally, for firms with excess cash, higher ITIs lead to increased research and development (R&D) expenses, capital expenditures, and spending on focused acquisitions as well as reduced payouts. Overall, our findings suggest that ITIs increase the value of cash by incentivizing CEOs to deploy cash strategically to capture its product-market benefits.