A number of recent papers examine the relationship between default risk and equity returns, and the results are mixed. These studies employ different measures of default risk and we find that correlations between eight diverse measures of default risk tend to be less than 50%. Nonetheless, we find that the relationship between stock returns and diverse measures of default risk tends to be consistent; default risk is a significant determinant of stock returns and this relationship is “hump backed”, as predicted by Garlappi and Yan (2011).

We study the effects of Confucian social norms on savings rates in China. In our simple two-period model, parents have the option to invest in either a risk-free asset or their children’s human capital. We assume that the filial piety norms and thus the enforcement mechanisms for supporting old-age parents differ across regions. Consequently, the probability of children’s non-performance of their repayment obligations to parents and the returns parents can expect from investing in their children vary. We test the model predictions using data from the China Household Finance Survey. We find that stronger Confucian social norms reduce the gap in the savings rate between families with sons and with daughters. Modeling default by children as a function of the prevailing social norms gives us the flexibility to study the impacts of declining Confucian influence on consumption–savings trends in China.

This paper analyses the effect of financial distress risk on the initial compensation contracts of new executives in the UK, where credit markets are more concentrated than in the US. We find that financial distress risk has a negative and statistically significant impact on the level of cash-based compensation and total compensation of executives, who are newly hired from either outside or inside the firm. This negative impact is accentuated in firms with a high fraction of bank debt, suggesting that banks, as creditors, provide monitoring and influence initial executive compensation packages in firms with high financial distress risk. Additionally, we find that financial distress risk has a negative and significant impact on the fraction of equity-based compensation for both externally and internally appointed executives.

We examine how firms' dividend policy affects the initial compensation of their newly appointed CEOs. We focus on newly appointed CEOs to isolate the effect of dividends on compensation and to provide new insights into an aspect largely neglected by compensation research. We show that the dividend payout is positively related to new CEO compensation. Further, the positive effect of dividends is stronger for firms with no dividend cuts over the past two, three and four years, firms with relatively high institutional ownership, and those with strong boards, consistent with new CEOs receiving higher pay as compensation for greater dividend pressure.

Using the staggered enactment of constituency statutes across US states, we find that banks with directors whose legal duties are expanded to consider stakeholder and long-term interests significantly reduce risk-taking by increasing capital and shifting to safer borrowers. Additionally, we find that the effect of statute enactment on bank performance is insignificant on average but significantly positive for banks that take excessive risk. Furthermore, we find that banks that previously received a statute enactment fared significantly better during the crises. Our findings support the increasing calls for greater emphasis on stakeholder interests amidst the current bank regulatory and governance reforms.

This paper investigates whether female independent directors are more likely to impose high dividend payouts. We find evidence that firms with a larger fraction of female directors on their board have greater dividend payouts. This finding is robust to alternative econometric specifications, and alternative measures of dividend payouts and female board representation. The positive effect of board gender composition on dividends remains when we employ propensity score matching, the instrumental variable approach, and difference-in-differences approach to address potential endogeneity concerns. Furthermore, we find that board gender composition significantly increases the dividend payout only for firms with weak governance, suggesting that female directors use dividend payouts as a governance device.

We find strong evidence that firms with employee-friendly workplaces achieve greater innovative success, particularly in industries where innovation is more difficult to achieve. Furthermore, employee-friendly firms were also more inclined to sustain R&D investment during the recent crisis. These findings are consistent with the view that an employee-friendly workplace helps to develop tolerance for failure, which encourages engagement in innovation. We find no support for alternative explanations, such as employee-friendly workplaces helping to attract and retain talented employees and reducing career concerns of executives, which could nurture innovation.

We investigate how the government, as a customer, affects a supplier’s environmental policies. We find that government contractors have significantly lower levels of toxic pollution. Exploring the mechanisms, we show that government contractors reduce pollution by strengthening internal environmental governance and increasing investments in pollution abatement. Further analysis rules out alternative explanations related to reduced economic activities and financial constraints. Overall, our results highlight the government’s important role in disciplining corporate environmental misbehavior.

We find strong evidence that when a firm's customer base is more concentrated, the firm's CEO receives more risk-taking incentives in her compensation package. This finding is robust to numerous alternative measures, alternative specifications, alternative subsamples, and different attempts that mitigate endogeneity concerns. Further, the positive effect of customer concentration on CEO risk-taking incentive provision is more prominent when the CEO is more reluctant to take risks, when the firm has more investment opportunities, and when the firm is more prone to the costs of losing large customers. These findings are consistent with the notion that boards provide additional risk-taking incentives to offset the CEO's aversion to the risk of non-diversified revenue streams, thereby preventing excessive managerial conservatism at the expense of value maximization.