To avoid a tie in voting, most boards have an odd number of directors. We argue that boards with an even number of directors are more likely to be weak monitors because of inefficient decision making and being captured by controlling shareholders. Consistent with this argument, we find that in China boards with an even number of directors have fewer meetings and are more likely to have board members absent from board meetings. Firms with an even number of directors have more tunnelling through intercorporate loans and related party transactions, lower financial reporting quality and higher incidence of accounting irregularities. This evidence is stronger in firms with weaker external monitoring and for directors with weaker incentives to monitor. Finally, we show that firms with an even number of directors are associated with lower market valuation of equity. Our results suggest that corporate boards with an even number of directors in emerging markets are associated with more agency problems.

Recent studies investigate the impact of air pollution on labor productivity. We extend this literature by showing that air pollution negatively affects equity analyst information production. Analysts exposed to air pollution are less likely to issue timely forecasts or improve their forecast accuracy. Investigating the underlying mechanism, we find that analysts exposed to air pollution are less likely to provide bold (especially, negatively bold) forecasts. We also find evidence that market pricing is less sensitive to forecast revisions issued by analysts exposed to air pollution. Our results are robust to controlling for firm/analyst and time fixed effects, as well as additional specifications employing difference-in-differences designs and placebo tests.