This study investigates the impact of non-punitive regulation on stock price crash risk. We use the inquiry letter issued by the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) in China as a proxy for non-punitive regulation. The results demonstrate that stock price crash risk decreases after the issuance of the inquiry letter. The reduction in crash risk is more pronounced for firms receiving a more detailed inquiry letter (or an inquiry letter requiring intermediary agencies to provide professional opinions) and for those that have more incentives or are more easily able to conceal bad news. The firm's response to the corresponding inquiry letter reduces crash risk. Furthermore, the impact of the inquiry letter on reducing crash risk is short-term, not long-term. These results indicate that the inquiry letter reduces crash risk by playing its information discovery role.

We provide evidence that small banks responded faster to Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) loan requests and lent more intensively to small businesses than larger banks. Using community bank pre-pandemic share of deposits/assets as an instrument for the intensity of PPP lending, we find a negative and significant relationship between county level bankruptcy filings and PPP lending per small business. Overall, our findings suggest that community banks remain an important conduit for small business credit particularly during crises when a rapid response is required.

There are two major institutional investors in the syndicated loan market: collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) and loan mutual funds. CLOs are closed-end funds while loan funds are open-end funds that issue claims that are redeemable on demand. In this paper, we examine whether CLOs provide arbitrage capital that contributes to the resilience of loan funds. We find that CLOs act as shock absorbers, providing liquidity through par-building trades when loan funds experience large outflows. However, CLO-provided liquidity is limited to par build–eligible loans, leading to potential flow-induced fire sales among par build–ineligible loans. (JEL G23, G38

Following an exogenous regulation change in China, we examine the impact of company visit disclosures on the fairness of market information acquisition. Before July 2012, company visits to Chinese listed firms were vaguely disclosed in annual reports long after they were conducted. After that, they were disclosed in detail within two trading days of their completion. Market reactions around visits are much stronger and more predictive of firms' future earnings if visits occurred after July 2012 and, thus, were disclosed in a timelier and more detailed manner. The timely disclosure of visit details also improves the forecast accuracy of non-visiting analysts, reduces forecast dispersion among analysts, and weakens the relative information advantages of visiting analysts. Because of this, visits are more concentrated on firms with poorer information environments, larger sizes, and manufacturing firms after July 2012, i.e., firms offering visitors larger potential benefits. In summary, the timely disclosure of visit details improves the fairness of information acquisition and decreases information asymmetry while causing information chilling effects for firms that provide fewer potential benefits to visitors.