We investigate the informational roles of foreign ownership in local credit rating agencies (CRAs) in the Chinese onshore debt market, which was the world's largest emerging debt market from 2008 to 2017. We find a robust negative relationship between the bond offering yield and foreign ownership in local CRAs, which suggests that these ratings certify the credit quality of debt issuers and thus enhance the market values of new debt issues. The information content of these ratings, however, is in contrast with the information provision role of foreign-owned CRAs (global CRAs). We find that these ratings provide no or weak better predictive power of issuers’ future credit performances than domestic CRAs. In addition, we find that stock and bond market reactions at the announcements of rating revisions made by global CRAs are not significantly different from those made by their domestic counterparts. We attribute the seemingly contradictory results to the preference for foreign brands in emerging markets and/or the improved bond liquidity associated with global CRA ratings.

We study how sharing a hometown or college connection with an incumbent member of China’s Politburo affects a candidate’s likelihood of selection as a new member. In specifications that include fixed effects to absorb quality differences across cities and colleges, we find that hometown and college connections are each associated with 5–9 percentage point reductions in selection probability. This “connections penalty” is equally strong for retiring Politburo members, arguing against quota-based explanations, and it is much stronger for junior Politburo members, consistent with a role for intra-factional competition. Our findings differ from earlier work because of our emphasis on within-group variation, and our focus on shared hometown and college, rather than shared workplace, connections.