This paper examines the effect of managerial legal liability coverage on earnings conservatism. Using directors’ and officers’ (D&O) liability insurance coverage and cash for indemnification as a proxy for managerial legal liability coverage, we find that the higher the managerial liability coverage, which reduces the expected legal liability of managers, the less conservative the firm's earnings. We also find that managerial legal liability coverage has a stronger influence on earnings conservatism in a legal regime with higher litigation risk. Our results are consistent with the threat of litigation conditioning managers to practice conservative accounting.

ABSTRACT This study examines the effect of capitalizing acquired in‐process research and development (IPR&D) on information asymmetry under Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 141 (R) (SFAS 141R). SFAS 141R requires acquirers to fully recognize IPR&D at fair value as an indefinite‐lived intangible asset until completion or discontinuation of the project. Prior research suggests IPR&D capitalization will result in an improvement in the information environment. In contrast, we find no evidence that capitalizing IPR&D improved the information environment for IPR&D acquirers. Instead, most of our results suggest no significant change in information asymmetry for IPR&D acquirers during the post‐SFAS 141R period, relative to the concurrent changes for non‐IPR&D acquirers. In cases in which the results suggest a statistically significant increase, the economic magnitudes are relatively small. In addition, we find no evidence that IPR&D acquirers engaged in increased classification shifting between IPR&D and goodwill during the post‐SFAS 141R period, as critics of capitalization had feared.