This study documents a significant positive announcement effect for a unique capital raising tool, stand alone warrants, in the Australian market. The result is consistent with the models of Schultz [J. Financ. Econom. 34 (1993) 109] and Mayers [J. Financ. Econom. 47 (1998) 83] where a warrant is viewed positively by the market. The results of the model developed to analyse the determinants of the announcement effect, support variants of the information asymmetry hypothesis (proxied by major shareholder pre-commitment and issue size).

This paper is the first to introduce an analysis of the effect of different types of venture capitalist value-added activities (financial, administrative, marketing, strategic/management) on fundraising. In addition, we include an analysis of the functional difference between committed funds and drawdowns from capital commitments vis-à-vis pension funds and venture capital funds. The new comprehensive data, collected by the Australian Bureau of Statistics for 1999–2001, enable controls for venture capitalist performance, risk, investment activity, and management and performance fees. The results indicate that significantly more capital is allocated to venture capitalists that provide financial and strategic/management expertise to entrepreneurial firms (as opposed to marketing and administrative expertise). In addition, fundraising is greater among funds with higher returns and performance fees and lower fixed management fees. In contrast, drawdowns from capital commitments are greater among venture capital funds that provide financial and marketing expertise to investees (as opposed to strategic and administrative expertise), and among funds with higher performance fees and fixed management fees. Further, the results indicate an adverse impact on venture capital fundraising from illiquidity attributable to a 2-year lock-up period in IPO exits over the period considered.