Application of choice theory to the selection of an appropriate accounting method has been dealt with in a number of recent publications.' Difficulties in pursuing this approach arise, however, when we introduce a number of users of accounting information. We cannot, in general, ascribe a group utility, or social welfare, function to a set of multiple users. As a result the notion of identifying the appropriate accounting system by maximizing some conceptually well specified objective function is often inappropriate in a multiperson setting.2 Nevertheless, there are numerous special cases which do admit to a group utility function. Obvious examples include a team and deferral to an expert (or dictator). More significant is the fact that similar results are achievable when the risks and returns of a cooperative decision are shared among the cooperating individuals in a Pareto optimal manner. For example, under suitable conditions, a partnership will admit to a group level or partnership utility function. The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that it is possible to view the problem of accounting method choice in a partnership as a formal, welldefined optimization problem. This has the theoretical advantage of explicitly linking the accounting choice to the partnership's economic situation, as well as opening up the possibility of studying optimality existence and characterization. Moreover, it provides a juxtaposition with extant accounting prescription. In particular, I shall demonstrate that, within the framework adopted, existing concepts of partnership accounting are in-

We have interpreted accounting theory as providing a complete and transitive ranking of accounting alternatives at the individual level. It was then proven that no set of standards (applied to the accounting alternatives per se) exists that will always rank accounting alternatives in relation to consistent individual preferences and beliefs. The major import of the result is to raise a number of questions. We know that standards do not always work. When, then, do they work? Under what types of conditions will various types of standards work; when they fail, how badly do they fail? We know that criteria systems, as in information theory, ASOBAT, or cost-allocation guides cannot be relied upon to provide the desired result in every situation. This does not, however, necessarily imply that they never provide the desired result. Hence, a major question in accounting theory must be conditions under which standards do work.