A principal (such as a centrist political party) can partially influence the allocation of power between two competing parties. The principal is closer to one party, the ``Friend'', than to the other, the ``Enemy''. The principal's optimal contract initially seeks to exclude the Enemy. However, once the Enemy gains power, the principal embraces him in exchange for policy moderation. Moderation also disciplines the Friend, inducing him to move closer to the principal's preferred policy. Principals close to the Friend fully embrace the Enemy; more centrist principals divide their support. Commitment benefits the principal only if she is close to the Friend and parties value power little.

Is more novel research always desirable? We develop a model in which knowledge shapes society's policies and guides the search for discoveries. Researchers select a question and how intensely to study it. The novelty of a question determines both the value and difficulty of discovering its answer. We show that the benefits of discoveries are nonmonotone in novelty. Knowledge expands endogenously step-by-step over time. Through a dynamic externality, moonshots -- research on questions more novel than what is myopically optimal -- can improve the evolution of knowledge. Moonshots induce research cycles in which subsequent researchers connect the moonshot to previous knowledge.

This paper explores the implications of a novel class of preferences for the behavior of asset prices. Following a suggestion by Marshall (1920), we entertain the possibility that people derive utility not only from consumption, but also from the very act of saving. These “saving-based” preferences are related to models of habit formation and the spirit of capitalism, but incorporate the feature that people have anticipatory habits because they care about the future accumulation of wealth. We derive the Euler equations for these preferences and estimate them with GMM. Our estimates suggest that the preference for saving is economically significant.