The authors evaluate journals based on their relative contributions to top-level finance research in a recent period. Journals are ranked according to the number of citations found in articles published in the Journal of Finance, Journal of Financial Economics, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, and Review of Financial Studies. The analysis controls for both the average number of articles and average number of words published annually in each cited journal. The authors identify the fifty most frequently cited journals during this period. They also list the fifty most frequently cited authors and articles and note topical trends in the research.

We evaluate journals based on their relative contributions to top-level finance research in a recent period. Journals are ranked according to the number of citations found in articles published in Journal of Finance, Journal of Financial Economics, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, and Review of Financial Studies. The analysis controls for both the average number of articles and average number of words published annually in each cited journal. We identify the fifty most frequently cited journals during this period. We also list the fifty most frequently cited authors and articles and note topical trends in the research.

We evaluate journals based on their relative contributions to top‐level finance research in a recent period. Journals are ranked according to the number of citations found in articles published in Journal of Finance, Journal of Financial Economics, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis , and Review of Financial Studies . The analysis controls for both the average number of articles and average number of words published annually in each cited journal. We identify the fifty most frequently cited journals during this period. We also list the fifty most frequently cited authors and articles and note topical trends in the research.

We assess the effects of the introduction and passage of state nonshareholder constituency statutes on shareholder wealth. We find a small, but significantly negative effect on shareholder wealth for companies incorporated in states passing nonshareholder constituency statutes that did not already have corporate takeover defenses in place. Further, we find that firms that are poorly managed (as proxied by low market-to-book ratios) react more negatively to the statutes.