This paper attempts to explain the correlation between money and output at various leads and lags with a model in which money is largely neutral and endogenously responds to output. Money is endogenous because both monetary policy and deposit creation are endogenous. Parameters are selected according to the simulated moments estimation technique. While the estimated model succeeds along some dimensions in matching properties of postwar U.S. data, its failure to match key patterns of lead-lag correlations seems to cast doubt on the ability of endogenous money determination, by itself, to quantitatively account for the observed money-output correlations. Copyright 1996 by American Economic Association.

This paper attempts to explain the correlation between money and output at various leads and lags with a model in which money is largely neutral and endogenously responds to output. Money is endogenous because both monetary policy and deposit creation are endogenous. Parameters are selected according to the simulated moments estimation technique. While the estimated model succeeds along some dimensions in matching properties of postwar U.S. data, its failure to match key patterns of lead-lag correlations seems to cast doubt on the ability of endogenous money determination, by itself, to quantitatively account for the observed money-output correlations.

A state-dependent income tax is incorporated into an intertemporal production economy. Methods are developed for establishing the existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium, and for explicitly constructing this equilibrium. Some tax-policy experiments are suggested, the results of which may have important implications in quantifying the effects of various tax policies.

We study cross-country differences in the aggregate production function when skilled and unskilled labor are imperfect substitutes. We find that there is a skill bias in cross-country technology differences. Higher-income countries use skilled labor more efficiently than lower-income countries, while they use unskilled labor relatively and, possibly, absolutely less efficiently. We also propose a simple explanation for our findings: rich countries, which are skilled-labor abundant, choose technologies that are best suited to skilled workers; poor countries, which are unskilled-labor abundant, choose technologies more appropriate to unskilled workers. We discuss alternative explanations, such as capital-skill complementarity and differences in schooling quality.

In Caselli and Coleman (2000) we developed a framework that separately identifies the efficiency units embodied in unskilled labor, skilled labor, and capital in a country’s aggregate production function. Applying that framework to cross-country data, we showed that countries where unskilled labor is relatively abundant are those with the most efficient unskilled workers, while countries where skilled labor and capital are abundant are the most efficient users of these inputs. We interpreted these findings as evidence of appropriatetechnology adoption: in each country firms choose from a menu of technologies; different technologies imply different combinations of values for the efficiency units embodied in the three factors of production; in each country the technology is chosen that makes the most of the most abundant factors. In this paper we apply the same framework to time-series data from the United States over the period 1963–1992. We find that throughout this period the efficiencies of skilled labor and capital have risen. The efficiency of unskilled labor has risen in tandem with those of the other factors in the early part of the sample, but surprisingly, it has been falling since sometime in the 1970’s (the exact turning point depends somewhat on some parametric assumptions). In analogy with the cross-country evidence, these changes are closely associated with changes in the relative abundance of skilled labor and capital, which increased rather dramatically. In this sense, the recent history of technologies in use by U.S. firms may mimic the choice of technologies around the world today: as skills and capital become more abundant, technologies are chosen that maximize the efficiency of these inputs. As we discuss below, however, in the U.S. context the converse story (relative labor supplies adjusting to exogenous changes in technology) is also consistent with the data. Besides its relevance to models of technology adoption, this evidence also sheds new light on the widely documented recent increase in the skilled wage premium in the United States. Lawrence F. Katz and Kevin M. Murphy (1992) and David H. Autor et al. (1998) used the relative wage and the relative labor supply series to show that the efficiency of unskilled labor relative to skilled labor must have declined over time. Our framework allows us to go further and show that, indeed, the absolute efficiency of unskilled labor has fallen (after 1970), while the efficiency of skilled labor and capital have increased. A similar result was obtained with different techniques by Marta Ruiz Arranz (2001).

We use data on imports of computer equipment for a large sample of countries between 1970-90 to investigate the determinants of computer-technology adoption. We find strong evidence that computer adoption is associated with higher levels of human capital and with manufacturing trade openness vis-à-vis the OECD. We also find evidence that computer adoption is enhanced by high investment rates, good property rights protection, and a small share of agriculture in GDP. Finally, there is some evidence that adoption is reduced by a large share of government in GDP, and increased by a large share of manufacturing. After controlling for the above-mentioned variables, we do not find an independent role for the English- (or European-) language skills of the population.

This paper develops and estimates a monetary model that offers an explanation of some puzzling features of observed returns on equities and default-free bonds. The key feature of the model is that some assets other than money play a special role in facilitating transactions, which affects the rate of return that they offer. The model is capable of producing a low risk-free rate, a high equity premium, and an average positive relationship between maturity and term premium for default-free bonds. The model's implications for the joint distribution of asset returns, velocity, inflation, money growth, and consumption growth are also compared to the behavior of these variables in the U.S. economy.

We present a joint study of the U.S. structural transformation (the decline of agriculture as the dominating sector) and regional convergence (of southern to northern average wages). We find empirically that most of the regional convergence is attributable to the structural transformation: the nationwide convergence of agricultural wages to nonagricultural wages and the faster rate of transition of the southern labor force from agricultural to nonagricultural jobs. Similar results describe the Midwest's catch-up to the Northeast (but not the relative experience of the West). To explain these observations, we construct a model in which the South (Midwest) has a comparative advantage in producing unskilled laborintensive agricultural goods. Thus it starts with a disproportionate share of the unskilled labor force and lower per capita incomes. Over time, declining education/training costs induce an increasing proportion of the labor force to move out of the (unskilled) agricultural sector and into the (skilled) nonagricultural sector. The decline in the agricultural labor force leads to an increase in relative agricultural wages. Both effects benefit the South (Midwest) disproportionately since it has more agricultural workers. With the addition of a less than unit income elasticity of demand for farm goods and faster technological progress in farming than outside of farming, this model successfully matches the quantitative features of the U.S. structural transformation and regional convergence, as well as several other stylized facts on U.S. economic growth in the last century. The model does not rely on frictions on interregional labor and capital mobility, since in our empirical work we find this channel to be less important than the compositional effects the model emphasizes.