I. Disorganization of the coal industry: Proposal of a permanent coal commission or parliament, 198. — II. Analysis of chaotic condition of American coal industry. Irregular operation of mines, 201. — Fluctuations in output due to seasonal demand, 201; to strikes, 202. — Effect of irregular operation on labor, on costs of production, on price, 203.—III. Regular operation in European mines. Absence of seasonal fluctuations, 204. — Graphic presentation of average monthly output of United States, Great Britain, and Germany, 206. — Effect of size of reserves on regularity of mine operation in United States, 207; in Europe, 209. — Difficulty of preventing overexpansion in United States, 211. — The Virginian Railway case, 211. — Control of seasonal fluctuations by syndicates in Germany, 213; through exports in Great Britain, 216; in the United States, 218. — IV. A permanent coal parliament, 222. — Its organization, 223. — German coal parliament, 224. — Permanent organization of needle trades, 225. — Creation of parliament by coal industry, 226. — Inclusion of middleman, 227. — Inclusion of consumer, 228. — Nation-wide scope, 229. — Basis of organization, 231. — Enforcement of decisions, 233. — Functions, 233. — Coal institute, 234. — V. Some remedies to be applied. Halting of overdevelopment, 235. — Closing of surplus mines, 236. — Shifting of surplus miners, 236. — Increasing of exports, 237. — Coal exchanges, 237. — Storage of coal, 238. — Unemployment insurance, 239. — Conclusion, 240.

The Coal Situation and the Coal Parliament: A Rejoinder Get access John E. Orchard John E. Orchard Columbia University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 39, Issue 4, August 1925, Pages 644–651, https://doi.org/10.2307/1883270 Published: 01 August 1925

I. Present disagreement on analysis of mine royalties, 290. — Ricardo's analysis, 291. — Modern writers: Taussig, Marshall, 292. — Limitation of Ricardian theory to settled countries and established industries, 293. — Rent of mineral land and agricultural land distinguished, 294. — Analysis of royalties in practice, 296. — II. Proof of the theory. Differences in royalties due to quality of coal, 297; to date of lease, location, fertility of mines, 299. — Relation of thickness to value of seam, 300. — The no-rent mine, 301. — Mine royalties in France, England, the United States, 302. — Graphic representation, 308. — Extensive and intensive margins; diminishing returns, 311. — III. Nationalization. Possible division of royalties if mines are purchased; if confiscated, 312. — Possible results under government operation, under lease to private operators, under free mining, 313. — Effect of nationalization on price of coal; on wages, 314. — Conclusion, 317.