Credit unions in the United States (US) are exempt (benefit from subsidies) from federal corporate income taxes, which are traditionally justified by their non-profit cooperative status and mission of meeting the financial needs of individuals of modest means. In recent years, the efficacy and fairness of these subsidies has been debated extensively as the traditional demarcation between banks and credit unions and their respective customer bases have blurred. To investigate how credit unions allocate subsidies to various stakeholders, we estimate a structural profit model for matched pairs of credit unions and commercial banks. We find that credit unions use most (approximately 90%) of their tax exemption for the benefit of their membership via above-market deposit interest rates.

This paper contributes to the bank efficiency literature through an application of recently developed random parameters models for stochastic frontier analysis. We estimate standard fixed and random effects models, and alternative specifications of random parameters models that accommodate cross-sectional parameter heterogeneity. A Monte Carlo simulations exercise is used to investigate the implications for the accuracy of the estimated inefficiency scores of estimation using either an under-parameterized, over-parameterized or correctly specified cost function. On average, the estimated mean efficiencies obtained from random parameters models tend to be higher than those obtained using fixed or random effects, because random parameters models do not confound parameter heterogeneity with inefficiency. Using a random parameters model, we analyse the evolution of the average rank cost efficiency for Latin American banks between 1985 and 2010. Cost efficiency deteriorated during the 1990s, particularly for state-owned banks, before improving during the 2000s but prior to the sub-prime crisis. The effects of the latter varied between countries and bank ownership types.

The Rosse–Panzar revenue test for competitive conditions in banking is based on observation of the impact on bank revenue of variation in factor input prices. We identify the implications for the H-statistic of misspecification bias in the revenue equation, arising when adjustment towards market equilibrium is partial and not instantaneous. In simulations, fixed effects estimation produces a measured H-statistic that is severely biased towards zero. Empirical results for the banking sectors of the Group of Seven (G7) countries corroborate our principal finding, that a dynamic formulation of the revenue equation is required for accurate identification of the H-statistic.

For US credit unions, revenue from non-interest sources has increased significantly in recent years. We investigate the impact of revenue diversification on financial performance for the period 1993–2004. The impact of a change in strategy that alters the share of non-interest income is decomposed into a direct exposure effect, reflecting the difference between interest and non-interest bearing activities, and an indirect exposure effect which reflects the effect of the institution’s own degree of diversification. On both risk-adjusted and unadjusted returns measures, a positive direct exposure effect is outweighed by a negative indirect exposure effect for all but the largest credit unions. This may imply that similar diversification strategies are not appropriate for large and small credit unions. Small credit unions should eschew diversification and continue to operate as simple savings and loan institutions, while large credit unions should be encouraged to exploit new product opportunities around their core expertise.

The growth of US credit unions during the 1990s is investigated empirically, using univariate and multivariate cross sectional and panel estimation techniques. Univariate tests of the law of proportionate effect suggest that in general large credit unions grew faster than their smaller counterparts. On average credit unions with above-average growth in one period tended to experience below-average growth in the next. Smaller credit unions tended to have more variable growth than large ones. While credit unions share a common co-operative philosophy, they differ in terms of age profile, scope for membership growth, charter type and financial structure and performance. In estimations of a multivariate growth model, most of these characteristics are found to have a significant influence on the size-growth relationship. While large state chartered credit unions grew faster than their smaller counterparts, the reverse was true for federally chartered credit unions. In general, if larger credit unions grew faster than smaller ones, they tended to do so for specific reasons: because their charters were less restrictive, because they were more efficient, or because they had a financial structure that was more conducive to growth. Therefore credit union growth was not `random', but highly systematic.

Against a background of far-reaching structural change in the banking sector, this article reviews the recent academic literature on developments in European banking. European banking markets have become increasingly integrated in recent years, but barriers to full integration, especially in retail banking, still remain. European integration has possible implications for systemic risk, and poses various challenges for the current supervisory framework. The banks’ responses to the changing competitive environment include the pursuit of strategies of diversification, vertical product differentiation and consolidation. European integration has implications for competition in banking markets, for the nature of long-term borrower-lender relationships, and for the relationships between ownership structure, technological change and bank efficiency. The article concludes by reviewing recent literature on the credit channel in the monetary transmission mechanism, and interest rate pass-through.

This paper examines the intensity of competition in 65 national banking industries. Country-level dynamic panel estimates of the persistence of bank profit are reported and compared. Persistence of bank profit is interpreted as an indicator of the intensity of competition, and as such is found to be consistent with traditional structure-based and conduct-based competition indicators. Persistence is negatively related to the rate of growth in GDP per capita, and positively related to the size of entry barriers. Persistence tends to be weaker, and competition stronger, in countries where institutional development is more advanced and external governance mechanisms are strong.