This paper demonstrates that, contrary to a widely held opinion, the determination of the goals of unions is fully amenable to empirical analysis. A characterization of the wage and employment-setting process in unionized markets is adopted, and its qualitative implications examined. The first-order condition for this model is fitted to time series data on the newspaper industry from ten cities. The International Typographical Union's objective function reveals very restricted opportunities for substituting wages for employment in response to a change in the slope of the employer's labor demand function. Larger union locals place greater emphasis on wages versus employment than smaller union locals.

Orley Ashenfelter, John H. Pencavel; American Trade Union Growth, 1900–1960: A Rejoinder, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 86, Issue 4, 1 Novembe

I. Some determinants of union growth, 435. — II. Empirical results, 439. — III. Consideration of some subperiods, 445. — IV Conclusion, 447.

Two models of wage and employment determination in unionized markets are routinely exposited. According to one, wage and employment outcomes are on the firm's labor demand curve; according to the other, wages and employment are on the partie' contract curve. This paper spells out an empirical procedure that discriminates between these two models and applies this procedure to the particular case of the newspaper industry and the International Typographical Union. The labor demand curve model is inconsistent with our data, while the contract curve model comes closer to describing our observations.

The wages and employment of typographers are examined to see whether they can be usefully characterized as the outcome of a process by which the union maximizes an objective function containing wages and employment and is constrained by a trade-off between these two variables as represented by the employer's labor demand function. Our functional form assumptions permit investigation of some familiar special cases of union behavior. The parameter implications of both the wage bill maximization hypothesis and the rent maximization hypothesis provide inferior explanations of the movement of wages and employment of these workers compared with our more general formulation.

The wages and employment of typographers are examined to see whether they can be usefully characterized as the outcome of a process by which the union maximizes an objective function containing wages and employment and is constrained by a trade-off between these two variables as represented by the employer's labor demand function. Our functional form assumptions permit investigation of some familiar special cases of union behavior. The parameter implications of both the wage bill maximization hypothesis and the rent maximization hypothesis provide inferior explanations of the movement of wages and employment of these workers compared with our more general formulation.

Two models of wage and employment determination in unionized markets are routinely exposited. According to one, wage and employment outcomes are on the firm's labor demand curve; according to the other, wages and employment are on the partie' contract curve. This paper spells out an empirical procedure that discriminates between these two models and applies this procedure to the particular case of the newspaper industry and the International Typographical Union. The labor demand curve model is inconsistent with our data, while the contract curve model comes closer to describing our observations.