ABSTRACT Aggregate U.S. bank lending to firms expanded following the outbreak of COVID‐19. Using loan‐level supervisory data, we show that this expansion was driven by draws on credit lines by large firms. Banks that experienced larger credit line drawdowns restricted term lending more, crowding out credit to smaller firms, which reacted by reducing investment. A structural model calibrated to match our empirical results shows that while credit lines increase total bank credit in bad times, they redistribute credit from firms with high propensities to invest to firms with low propensities to invest, exacerbating the decrease in aggregate investment.

Abstract Two main creditors exist in commercial real estate: arm’s-length investors and banks. We model commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) as the less informed source of credit. In equilibrium, these investors fund properties with a low probability of distress, and banks fund properties that may require renegotiation. As a natural experiment, we test the model using the collapse of the CMBS market during 2007–2009, when banks funded both collateral types. Our results show that properties likely to have been securitized were less likely to default or be renegotiated. This suggests that securitization in this market funds safe collateral.