In trade liberalization between a large country and a small one, if production requires irreversible investments, anticipated negotiations may make the small country strictly worse off than a fully anticipated trade war, and indeed worse off than autarchy. The reason is that investors, anticipating liberal trade, will invest in the export sector, making the small country dependent on trade with the large one and thus ruining its bargaining power. This effect is dominated by conventional effects, so that anticipated bargaining benefits the small country on balance, if there is sufficient: (i) dissimilarity between the economies, and (ii) substitutability between goods.

We present a model of oligopolistic commodity speculation, in which a limited number of speculators practice non-cooperative storage in an infinite-horizon game. A significant technical difficulty due to the non-negative stock constraint is overcome, and a tractable sub-game perfect equilibrium is presented, in which it is shown that less is stored and prices are more volatile than under perfect competition. It turns out that a tax on consumption of the good would increase storage, stabilize prices, increase welfare and raise speculative profits; the oligopolists would thus lobby for a tariff raised against their own shipments.

This paper analyzes the effects of international openness on vertical integration. Vertical integration can confer a negative externality, by thinning the market for inputs and thus worsening opportunism problems; this induces strategic complementarity and multiple equilibria in the integration decision, thus providing a theory of different “industrial systems” or “industrial cultures” in ex ante identical countries. International openness thickens the market, facilitating leaner, less integrated firms, thus providing gains from international openness quite different from those that are familiar from trade theory. This may be taken as one theory of “outsourcing,” “downsizing,” and “Japanization” as consequences of “globalization.”

This paper studies trade liberation between a lag country and a small one. We make two key assumptions, suggested by political debates on trade reform in small countries. First, future production requires an irreversible investment now. Second, There is a the possibility of future trade negotiations. Strikingly, anticipated trade negotiations mau make the small country strictly worse off than a fully anticipated trade war, and indeed worse off than autarchy. The reason is a negative strategic externality in the small country conferred by anyone investing in country into trade with the large one, harming its bargaining trade, so that anticipated bargeing benefits the small country on balance only if (i) the two economies are sufficiently different, and (ii) there are sufficient substitutions possibilities in consumption.

Using U.S. Census data for 1990 to 2000, we estimate effects of NAFTAon U.S.wages.We look for effects of the agreement by industry and by geography, measuring each industry's vulnerability to Mexican imports and each locality's dependence on vulnerable industries. We find evidence of both effects, dramatically lowering wage growth for blue-collar workers in the most affected industries and localities (even for service-sector workers in affected localities, whose jobs do not compete with imports). These distributional effects are much larger than aggregate welfare effects estimated by other authors.

The welfare effects of trade shocks turn on the nature and magnitude of the costs workers face in moving between sectors. Using an Euler-type equilibrium condition derived from a rational expectations model of dynamic labor adjustment, we estimate the mean and variance of workers' switching costs from the US CPS. We estimate high values of both parameters, implying slow adjustment of the economy and sharp movements in wages in response to trade shocks. However, import-competing workers can still benefit from tariff removal; liberalization lowers their wages in the short and long run but raises their option value.