In this paper, the authors examine the warrant price and stock price reactions to the announcement of warrant life extensions. As predicted by option-pricing theory, warrant prices increase in response to an extension. The authors' principal finding is that the stocks of firms making the extension announcements experience positive abnormal returns on average. They interpret the evidence as supportive of an anticipation hypothesis in which the market perceiv es the decision to extend the warrants' expiration date as a favorable indication for the stock price before the subsequent expiration.

In this paper, we examine the warrant price and stock price reactions to the announcement of warrant life extensions. As predicted by option-pricing theory, warrant prices increase in response to an extension. Our principal finding is that the stocks of firms making the extension announcements experience positive abnormal returns on average. We interpret the evidence as supportive of an anticipation hypothesis in which the market perceives the decision to extend the warrants' expiration date as a favorable indication for the stock price before the subsequent expiration.

ABSTRACT In this paper, we examine the warrant price and stock price reactions to the announcement of warrant life extensions. As predicted by option‐pricing theory, warrant prices increase in response to an extension. Our principal finding is that the stocks of firms making the extension announcements experience positive abnormal returns on average. We interpret the evidence as supportive of an anticipation hypothesis in which the market perceives the decision to extend the warrants' expiration date as a favorable indication for the stock price before the subsequent expiration.

A vector autoregressive (VAR) model is used to examine the relation between aggregate insider transactions and stock market returns. Consistent with the extant literature, there is some predictive content associated with aggregate insider transactions, but its magnitude is slight. In contrast, market returns have substantial influence on the aggregate purchases and sales of corporate insiders. The findings suggest that: 1) the degree of mispricing observed by insiders is small; 2) very little of the mispricing is associated with unanticipated macroeconomic factors; and 3) investors cannot use aggregate insider transactions to profitably predict future market returns over the following eight weeks.