I compare the performance of three measures of institution-level systemic risk exposure — Exposure CoVaR (Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2016), systemic expected shortfall (Acharya et al., 2016), and Granger causality (Billio et al., 2012). I modify Exposure CoVaR to allow for forecasting, and estimate the ability of each measure to forecast the performance of financial institutions during systemic crisis periods in 1998 (LTCM) and 2008 (Lehman Brothers). I find that Exposure CoVaR forecasts the within-crisis performance of financial institutions, and provides useful forecasts of future systemic risk exposures. Systemic expected shortfall and Granger causality do not forecast the performance of financial institutions reliably during crises. I also find, using cross-sectional regressions, that foreign equity exposure and securitization income determine systemic risk exposure during the 1998 and 2008 crises, respectively; financial institution size determines systemic risk exposure during both crisis periods; and executive compensation does not determine systemic risk exposure.

This paper examines the impact of the composition of local banking markets on customer satisfaction. I measure customer satisfaction at the county level using complaint data filed with the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) from 2012 to 2017. I find that there are fewer customer complaints in counties where there is a larger presence of small banks, holding constant the level of bank competition. This effect holds for various complaint types, market types, market demographics, and alternative econometric specifications. Additionally, I provide a detailed description of the CFPB complaint data.

I examine the relation between Federal Reserve emergency actions and aggregate U.S. systemic risk during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and the COVID-19 crisis. I divide these actions in to three categories: lender of last resort (LLR), liquidity provision, and open market operations (OMO). Evidence suggests that during the GFC, liquidity provision and OMO was related*⁎Associate Professor, Department of Finance and Real Estate, Villanova School of Business. E-mail: [email protected]. I am grateful for helpful comments from Allen Berger, Lamont Black, Jennifer Dlugosz, Mike Pagano, and Alvaro Taboada and for comments from participants at the 2019 Southern Financial Association Annual Meetings.Charlotte Bern and Jonathan Wadowski provided excellent research assistance. All errors are my own. to reduced systemic risk, while evidence on LLR actions is mixed. Further, I find that Federal Reserve actions were related to increased stability in other G8 financial systems during the GFC, and that after the GFC, facilities that remained operational were no longer related to aggregate systemic risk. I do not find a relation between Federal Reserve actions and systemic risk during the COVID-19 crisis. Together, these findings can inform actions and policy decisions in future financial crises.

We find that heightened cross-border bank flows are associated with lower systemic risk in a target country’s banking system. The reductions in systemic risk are stronger for flows coming from source countries with stronger regulatory oversight than the target country. Such cross-border bank flows linked to regulatory arbitrage are also associated with improvements in target banking sector profitability, asset quality, and efficiency. We assess several alternative channels of influence for cross-border bank flows but interpret the evidence on these flows as mostly consistent with a benign form of regulatory arbitrage.

Using an integrated model to control for simultaneity, as well as new risk measurement techniques such as Adapted Exposure CoVaR and Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES), we show that the aggregate systemic risk exposure of financial institutions is positively related to sovereign debt yields in European countries in an episodic manner, varying positively with the intensity of the financial crisis facing a particular nation. We find evidence of a simultaneous relation between systemic risk exposure and sovereign debt yields. This suggests that models of sovereign debt yields should also include the systemic risk of a country's financial system in order to avoid potentially important mis-specification errors. We find evidence that systemic risk of a country's financial institutions and the risk of sovereign governments are inter-related and shocks to these domestic linkages are stronger and longer lasting than international risk spillovers. Thus, the channel in which domestic sovereign debt yields can be affected by another nation's sovereign debt is mostly an indirect one in that shocks to a foreign country's government finances are transmitted to that country's financial system which, in turn, can spill over to the domestic financial system and, ultimately, have a destabilizing effect on the domestic sovereign debt market.

Theory suggests that government aid to banks may either reduce or increase systemic risk. We are the first to address this issue empirically, analyzing the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP). Analysis suggests that TARP significantly reduced contributions to systemic risk, particularly for larger and safer banks, and those in better local economies. This occurred primarily through a capital cushion channel that reduced market leverage by increasing the value of common equity. Results are robust to endogeneity and selection bias checks. Findings yield policy conclusions about whether to aid banks, the best targets for future assistance, and short-term versus long-term effects.

While operational risk is generally perceived as idiosyncratic with limited systemic implications, we document that operational risk threatens financial stability. Using supervisory data on large U.S. Bank Holding Companies (BHCs), we find operational losses increase systemic risk through a direct channel that impairs market values of loss-experiencing BHCs as well as a channel of correlated losses that impact multiple institutions simultaneously. Findings are driven by tail events, more pronounced for systemically important and closer-to-distress BHCs, and vary by business lines, event types, and financial/economic environments. Our results extend the operational and systemic risk literatures and have key policy implications.

Bank prudential supervision is designed to enhance financial stability, but we are unaware of extant empirical research linking this supervision to financial system risk. In particular, there are no prior findings on how supervision enforcement actions (EAs) – major tools of supervisors – affect systemic risk. We empirically investigate relations between EAs and banks’ contributions to systemic risk. We find significantly smaller bank contributions to systemic risk after EAs than before them, suggesting that EAs are associated with enhanced financial stability. The data also suggest that the primary channel behind this relation is reduced leverage, but lower portfolio risk also plays a role. We also find that the magnitude of our findings is greater during financial crises than normal times, and that more severe EAs and EAs against banks are more effective in systemic risk reduction than that are those less severe and those against individual bank managers, respectively.