This article explores the causes and consequences of cross-country variation in mortgage market structure. It draws on insights from several fields: urban economics, asset pricing, behavioral finance, financial intermediation, and macroeconomics. It discusses lessons from the credit boom, the challenges of mortgage modification in the aftermath of the boom, consumer financial protection, and alternative mortgage forms and funding models. The article argues that the USA has much to learn from mortgage finance in other countries, and specifically from the Danish implementation of the European covered bonds system.
The New Palgrave Dictionary of Money and Finance is a successor to the 1987 work The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics. Both dictionaries claim descent from Palgrave's Dictionary of Political Economy, published as a summary of the state of economics during the 1890s. The same team of three editors is responsible for both New Palgrave dictionaries,1 and there are many similarities in approach. Indeed, about 20 percent of the essays in the New Palgrave Money and Finance are reprinted from the New Palgrave Economics (and ten essays are reprinted from the original Palgrave). There are also some obvious differences between the two New Palgrave dictionaries. The New Palgrave Economics had a much broader scope, aiming to cover all of modern economics. It was considerably larger than the New Palgrave Money and Finance, with four volumes rather than three, 3500 pages rather than 2500, and almost 2000 essays rather than 1000 or so. The New Palgrave Economics included biographical essays, which took up about a third of the work; the New Palgrave Money and Finance has no biography but includes many short definitions of technical terms. Last but not least, the New Palgrave Economics omitted empirical topics to concentrate on economic theory and history of economic thought, while the New Palgrave Money and Finance covers much empirical material.
Journal of Financial Economics198718(2), 373-399open access
In monthly U.S. data for 1959–1979 and 1979–1983, the state of the term structure of interest rates predicts excess stock returns, as well as excess returns on bills and bonds. This paper documents this fact and uses it to examine some simple asset pricing models. In 1959–1979, the data strongly reject a single-latent-variable specification of predictable excess returns. There is considerable evidence that conditional variances of excess returns change through time, but the relationship between conditional mean and conditional variance is reliably positive only at the short end of the term structure.
Quarterly Journal of Economics1986101(4), 785open access
This paper studies asset pricing in a general equilibrium representative agent exchange model. The assumptions of isoelastic period utility and lognormal endowment allow the derivation of closed-form solutions for asset returns without restricting the serial correlation of the log endowment. Risk premiums on stocks and real bonds are found to be simple functions of relative risk aversion, the variance of the log endowment innovation, and the weights in the moving average representation of the log endowment. The paper analyzes the sign of term premiums, the size of the equity premium, and the effect of taste shocks on asset prices.
The permanent income hypothesis implies that people save because they rationally expect their labor income to decline; they save a rainy day. It follows that saving should be at least as good a predictor of declines in labor income as any other forecast that can be constructed from publicly available information.The paper tests this hitherto ignored implication of the permanent income hypothesis, using quarterly aggregate data for the period 1953-84 in the U.S. A vector autoregression for saving and changes in labor income is used to generate an unrestricted forecast of declines in labor income. In the VAR, saving Granger causes labor income changes as one would expect if the PIH is true. The mean of the unrestricted forecast is far from the mean of saving, but the dynamics of the two series are quite similar.The paper presents both formal test statistics and an informal evaluation of the fit of the permanent income hypothesis. By contrast with most of the recent literature, the results here are valid when income is nonstationary.
American Economic Review2016106(5), 1-30open access
This lecture considers the case for consumer financial regulation in an environment where many households lack the knowledge to manage their financial affairs effectively. The lecture argues that financial ignorance is pervasive and unsurprising given the complexity of modern financial products, and that it contributes meaningfully to the evolution of wealth inequality. The lecture uses a stylized model to discuss the welfare economics of paternalistic intervention in financial markets, and discusses several specific examples including asset allocation in retirement savings, fees for unsecured short-term borrowing, and reverse mortgages.
This paper proposes a new way to generalize the insights of static asset pricing theory to a multiperiod setting. The paper uses a loglinear approximation to the budget constraint to substitute out consumption from a standard intertemporal asset pricing model. In a homoscedastic lognormal setting, the consumption--wealth ratio is shown to depend on the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption, while asset risk premia are determined by the coefficient of relative risk aversion. Risk premia are related to the covariances of asset returns with the market return and with news about the discounted value of all future market returns.
The study of household finance is challenging because household behavior is difficult to measure, and households face constraints not captured by textbook models. Evidence on participation, diversification, and mortgage refinancing suggests that many households invest effectively, but a minority make significant mistakes. This minority appears to be poorer and less well educated than the majority of more successful investors. There is some evidence that households understand their own limitations and avoid financial strategies for which they feel unqualified. Some financial products involve a cross‐subsidy from naive to sophisticated households, and this can inhibit welfare‐improving financial innovation.