We investigate the success of legislation aimed at increasing competition at highly concentrated U.S. airports, mainly by forcing these airports to increase the availability of scarce facilities. We use a multidimensional regression-discontinuity approach to exploit a sharp discontinuity in the law’s implementation and identify its effects. We find that fares decrease by 13.4% (20.2%) in markets with one (both) end point(s) covered. Approximately half of the decline is driven by the entry of low-cost carriers. We find little evidence that the fare declines were accompanied by a diminished quality of service, and passenger volumes increased, which suggests the legislation improved consumer welfare.

We estimate demand for residential broadband using high-frequency data from subscribers facing a three-part tariff. The three-part tariff makes data usage during the billing cycle a dynamic problem, thus generating variation in the (shadow) price of usage. We provide evidence that subscribers respond to this variation, and we use their dynamic decisions to estimate a flexible distribution of willingness to pay for different plan characteristics. Using the estimates, we simulate demand under alternative pricing and find that usage-based pricing eliminates low-value traffic. Furthermore, we show that the costs associated with investment in fiber-optic networks are likely recoverable in some markets, but that there is a large gap between social and private incentives to invest.

Competition authorities have expressed concern that firms selling broadband internet and TV subscriptions may employ usage-based pricing (UBP) of internet to steer consumers toward TV over streaming video. We study this issue with household-level panel data from an internet service provider's UBP experiment, capturing the prices' effects on internet and TV subscriptions, internet usage, and firm revenue. We find that this specific UBP policy largely served to meter internet usage by high-demand households rather than steer them toward TV. Households' payments increased due to usage-related overage charges and internet subscription upgrades to avoid overages. Some households avoided internet-related payments by reducing usage rather than adding TV subscriptions.

We develop a model of inter-temporal and intra-temporal price discrimination by monopoly airlines to study the ability of different discriminatory pricing mechanisms to increase efficiency and the associated distributional implications. To estimate the model, we use unique data from international airline markets with flight-level variation in prices across time, cabins, and markets and information on passengers’ reasons for travel and time of purchase. The current pricing practice yields approximately 77% of the first-best welfare. The source of this inefficiency arises primarily from private information about passenger valuations, not dynamic uncertainty about demand. We also find that if airlines could discriminate between business and leisure passengers, total welfare would improve at the expense of business passenger surplus. Also, replacing the current pricing that involves screening passengers across cabin classes with offering a single cabin class has minimal effect on total welfare.

The video entertainment industry is experiencing increases in over-the-top (OTT) video usage and cord-cutting behavior. Using unique panel data from 2012–2016, we document the behavior of the 2.4% of households who “cut the cord” annually. After dropping TV, these households increase internet usage by 22%, reduce payments to multiple-system operators (MSOs) by 50%, and 16% acquire new OTT video subscriptions. These results indicate meaningful substitution between OTT video and TV and suggest that competition authorities should consider broadening market definitions. MSOs appear to have little incentive to degrade OTT video, despite OTT video's contribution to declining TV revenues.