We show that banks manipulate borrowers' credit ratings before sharing them with competing banks. Using a unique feature on the timing of information disclosure of a public credit registry, we disentangle the effect of manipulation from learning of credit ratings. We show that banks downgrade high-quality borrowers for which they have positive private information to protect their informational rents. Banks also upgrade low-quality borrowers with multiple lenders to avoid creditor runs. Our results suggest that credit ratings manipulation limits the positive effects of credit registries' information disclosure on credit allocation.

Information, which can arrive in multiple forms, is a fundamental component of all financial transactions and markets. We define hard and soft information and describe the relative advantages of each. Hard information is quantitative, is easy to store, and can be transmitted in impersonal ways. Its information content is independent of its collection. As technology changes, the way we collect, process, and communicate information, it changes the structure of markets, the design of financial intermediaries, and the incentives to use or misuse information. We survey the literature to understand how information type influences the continued evolution of financial markets and institutions. Received October 25, 2016; editorial decision September 6, 2018 by Editor Efraim Benmelech.

We investigate how financial contracting interacts with lending-channel effects by tracing the anatomy of a credit supply shock using micro-level data from a multinational bank. Borrowers with stronger lending relationships, higher nonlending revenues, and those that pledge collateral, especially outside assets and real estate, experience less credit rationing. Consistent with a tightening of financing constraints post shock, borrower composition shifts toward larger and less risky firms, and loans exhibit higher collateralization rates. Our analysis highlights the value of relationships and suggests that relationship banking is a channel through which borrowers can mitigate lending-channel effects.

This paper provides evidence that lenders to a firm close to distress have incentives to coordinate: lower financing by one lender reduces firm creditworthiness and causes other lenders to reduce financing. To isolate the coordination channel from lenders' joint reaction to new information, we exploit a natural experiment that forced lenders to share negative private assessments about their borrowers. We show that lenders, while learning nothing new about the firm, reduce credit in anticipation of other lenders' reaction to the negative news about the firm. The results show that public information exacerbates lender coordination and increases the incidence of firm financial distress.

We present evidence that reassigning tasks among agents can alleviate moral hazard in communication. A rotation policy that routinely reassigns loan officers to borrowers of a commercial bank affects the officers' reporting behavior. When an officer anticipates rotation, reports are more accurate and contain more bad news about the borrower's repayment prospects. As a result, the rotation policy makes bank lending decisions more sensitive to officer reports. The threat of rotation improves communication because self‐reporting bad news has a smaller negative effect on an officer's career prospects than bad news exposed by a successor.

Using unique internal bank data on ex ante appraised liquidation and market values of assets pledged as collateral in sixteen countries, we show that laws and institutions that strengthen creditor protection increase expected recovery rates for collateral. Stronger creditor protection increases expected recovery rates for movable collateral relative to immovable collateral and shifts the composition of collateral toward movable assets, thereby increasing debt capacity through both higher loan-to-values and attenuating the creditor’s liquidation bias. Our results suggest that the recovery rate for collateral is an important first-stage mechanism through which creditor protection can improve contracting efficiency and enhance access to credit. Received September 17, 2018; editorial decision July 9, 2019 by Editor Andrew Ellul.

We show that banks manipulate borrowers’ credit ratings before sharing them with competing banks. Using a unique feature on the timing of information disclosure of a public credit registry, we disentangle the effect of manipulation from learning of credit ratings. We show that banks downgrade high-quality borrowers for which they have positive private information to protect their informational rents. Banks also upgrade low-quality borrowers with multiple lenders to avoid creditor runs. Our results suggest that credit ratings manipulation limits the positive effects of credit registries’ information disclosure on credit allocation.Received April 18, 2016; editorial decision April 1, 2017 by Editor Philip Strahan.