Do the implications for business cycle issues change when we switch from studying infinitely-lived, representative-agent models to more sophisticated demographic structures with finitely lived agents? This article addresses that question by using a large, overlapping-generations model that is calibrated to U.S. demographic properties, microeconomic evidence, and National Income and Product Accounts. The finding is that the answers obtained are basically the same for the two kinds of models. The article also explores the relative volatility of hours across age groups, an issue that cannot be addressed by using the infinitely-lived, representative-agent abstraction.

Over time, productivity and education have increased, while hours worked have not. Cross-sectionally, higher-wage individuals have more schooling, more hours worked in the market, fewer hours worked at home, and a lower variance of market hours. Over the life cycle, older individuals have higher wages, more hours worked both in the market and at home, a lower variance of market hours, and almost the same amount of education as younger agents. These and other facts are documented, and a simple overlapping-generations model with skill acquisition and home production which delivers most of these properties is constructed.

Using life insurance holdings by age, sex, and marital status, we infer how individuals value consumption in different demographic stages. We estimate equivalence scales and bequest motives simultaneously within a fully specified model where agents face US demographics and save and purchase life insurance. Our findings indicate that individuals are very caring for dependents, that economies of scale are large, that children are very costly (or yield very high marginal utility), that wives with children produce lots of home goods, and that females display habits from marriage, while men do not. These findings contrast sharply with standard equivalence scales.

We study a positive theory of stagnation and growth aimed at understanding the large variations in growth outcomes across actual economies. The theory points to the fundamental role played by vested interests in determining policies which are key to the growth process: some agents seek to prevent the adoption of new technologies. We develop a model of technology adoption, and show how technological innovation may sow the seeds of its own destruction. In particular, we find that the equilibrium is characterized by a long cycle of stagnation and growth. Over this cycle, incumbent innovators have sufficient political influence that new technologies are prohibited, and only as these incumbents are phased out of the economy will new innovation occur. In formalizing our theory we make a methodological contribution by characterizing dynamic voting equilibria in which voters must forecast the effects of different current policies on future prices and policy outcomes.

We document that countries partially default often and with varying intensity, resulting in lengthy episodes and hump-shaped patterns for partial default and debt. Default episodes lead to haircuts for lenders but not to reductions in debt, because the defaulted debt accumulates and borrowing continues. We present a theory of partial default rationalizing these patterns and the heterogeneity of partial default, and partial default’s comovements with spreads, debt, and output that are absent in standard sovereign default theory. We include policy counterfactuals in the form of pari passu and no-dilution clauses and debt-relief policies, and their welfare implications.

Global financial imbalances can result from financial integration when countries differ in financial markets development. Countries with more advanced financial markets accumulate foreign liabilities in a gradual, long-lasting process. Differences in financial development also affect the composition of foreign portfolios: countries with negative net foreign asset positions maintain positive net holdings of nondiversifiable equity and foreign direct investment. Three observations motivate our analysis: (1) financial development varies widely even among industrial countries, with the United States on top; (2) the secular decline in the U.S. net foreign asset position started in the early 1980s, together with a gradual process of international financial integration; (3) the portfolio composition of U.S. net foreign assets features increased holdings of risky assets and a large increase in debt.

We show that a theory of earnings and wealth inequality, based on the optimal choices of ex ante identical households that face uninsured idiosyncratic shocks to their endowments of efficiency labor units, accounts for the U.S. earnings and wealth inequality almost exactly.

We pose good markets frictions on top of an otherwise standard two-country international real business cycle (IRBC) model. Shopping for goods takes effort, which prevents perfect matching between customers and producers. An increase in search effort implies increased measured productivity. Demand shocks increase expenditures and search effort simultaneously increasing output, consumption, productivity, and the trade deficit and appreciating the real exchange rate. Thus we solve the Backus-Smith puzzle and we show that the cross country correlation of consumption is higher than that of output. Standard IRBC models cannot account for these puzzles along with movements in TFP.

We study a dynamic version of Meltzer and Richard's median-voter model of the size of government. Taxes are proportional to total income, and they are redistributed as equal lump-sum transfers. Voting takes place periodically over time, and each consumer votes for the tax rate that maximizes his equilibrium utility. We calibrate the model to U.S. data. Key elements in the calibration are the income and wealth distribution and the parameters governing the leisure and consumption choices. The total size of transfers predicted by our political-economy model is quite close to the size of transfers in the data.

We provide a macroeconomic theory where demand for goods has a productive role. A search friction prevents perfect matching between producers and potential customers. Larger demand induces more search, which, in turn, increases GDP and measured total factor productivity (TFP). We embed the product-market friction in a standard neoclassical model and estimate it using Bayesian techniques. Business cycles are driven by preference shocks, true technology shocks, and investment-specific shocks. Preference shocks have qualitatively similar effects as true productivity shocks. These shocks account for a large share of the fluctuations in consumption, GDP, and measured TFP and can be identified using shopping time data.