An IPO's initial return contains new information about the true value of the firm and, hence, provides vital feedback for the investment decision. A high initial return encourages managers to expand, while a lower than expected post-IPO price leads to a reduction of the capital budget. Information production by market participants increases the precision of the market feedback captured in the first competitively determined stock price. Managers can entice investors to produce more information by selling larger stakes at lower prices. A too low offer price, however, attracts uninformed investors and decreases information production.

A Kyle (1985) model with private information diffusion is used to examine the motivation to spread stock tips. An informed investor with limited investment capacity spreads imprecise rumors to an audience of followers. Followers trade on the advice and move the price. Due to the imprecision of the rumor, the price overshoots with positive probability. This gives the rumormonger the opportunity to trade twice: First when she receives information, then when she knows the price to be overshooting. In equilibrium, rumors are informative and both rumormongers and followers increase their profits at the expense of uninformed liquidity traders.

We propose the Volume Coefficient of Variation (VCV), the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean of trading volume, as a new and simple measure of information asymmetry in security markets. We use a microstructure model to demonstrate that VCV is strictly increasing in the proportion of informed trade. Empirically, we obtain VCV from daily observations of trading volume and provide extensive evidence supporting the hypothesis that VCV indicates information asymmetry, by studying return reversals, institutional ownership, and extant firm-level measures of asymmetric information in the cross-section of US stocks. Moreover, VCV increases following exogenous reductions in analyst coverage induced by brokerage closures, and steeply decreases around earnings announcements and other information disclosures.

An endless leverage certificate (ELC) is a novel retail structured product that gives its holder the right to claim the difference between the value of an underlying security and an interest accruing financing level. An ELC ceases to exist if the underlying breaches a contractual knockout level, if the holder exercises, or if she/he sells it back to the issuer. We use Monte Carlo analysis to value ELCs and find that due to limited liability, a typical ELC written on a typical DAX stock can be worth 0.3% more than its intrinsic value (the difference between the value of the underlying and the financing level). Empirically, we find that in January 2007, the 5129 ELCs issued on the thirty DAX stocks traded at an average premium of 0.67% over the intrinsic value, and that the median bid-ask spread, expressed as a percentage of the underlying, was 0.18%. For covered warrants and options this spread measure was almost twice as high. Finally, we find that upon knockout, investors received on average 3.2% less than the theoretical knockout value, which is consistent with discontinuous trading of the underlying. Overall, our findings suggest that ELCs complete the market for leverage seeking retail investors.

This paper presents an empirical test of the ‘market feedback hypothesis’, a theory suggesting that information aggregated in the IPO process is used for the firm’s investment decision. We examine the relation between post-IPO unexpected capital expenditures and feedback generated during the IPO process for 1543 IPOs between 1987 and 1995. Feedback is measured by (i) the unexpected price adjustment made at the end of the waiting period and (ii) the unexpected initial return. Consistent with the hypothesis, we find that positive feedback is followed by positive abnormal capital expenditures. A long-term event study finds no significant difference in stock returns between positive and negative feedback IPOs. This suggests that firms should not ignore market feedback as there is no evidence for a feedback related bias in post-IPO stock prices.

This paper analyzes market discipline in a many-bank economy where contagion and bank runs interact. We present a model with differently-informed depositors, where those depositors that are more informed have incentives to monitor banks’ investments. It is shown that when banks are undercapitalized, and the probability of success of the risky asset is low, depositors might prefer a contract that is subject to bank runs in the interim period to a contract that allows banks to gamble with their funds and maintain their investment.The results of the paper emphasize the benefits of private monitoring of banks in order to promote market discipline.