The hypothesis that crop production is more variable under socialism than under capitalism because of systemic differences between incentives and the structure of property rights in private and socialized farms is tested in two ways. The first test compares the variability of output for seven crops in five eastern European countries for a period when agriculture was private with a period when it was socialized. The second test compares the variability of output in state, collective, and private farms within each country. These tests confirm that socialization of agriculture increases the variability of crop output and that the source of this increased variability is not greater fluctuations in yields but rather in the acreage devoted to individual crops.

The hypothesis that crop production is more variable under socialism than under capitalism because of systemic differences between incentives and the structure of property rights in private and socialized farms is tested in two ways. The first test compares the variability of output for seven crops in five eastern European countries for a period when agriculture was private with a period when it was socialized. The second test compares the variability of output in state, collective, and private farms within each country. These tests confirm that socialization of agriculture increases the variability of crop output and that the source of this increased variability is not greater fluctuations in yields but rather in the acreage devoted to individual crops.

The ability of planners in Poland and the U.S.S.R. to recognize and act to eliminate market disequilibrium in the markets for grain and meat is tested by means of an econometric model of grain and meat production, consumption, and trade. Planners' perceptions of excess demand for grain, meat, and foreign exchange are shown to influence production and trade decisions in a way that tends to reduce excess demand or supply. Nevertheless, the markets for grain, meat, and foreign exchange are shown to be characterized by excess demand or supply for much of the sample period.

We examine six integration schemes and decompose their ability to increase inter-member trade into environmental, policy and system effects. Environmental factors caused the greatest variation in trade creation, with inter-member distance the most important environmental variable. The CACM and EFTA have followed more effective integration policies than the EEC, LAFTA and the Andean Pact. Although integration can thus benefit developed and developing countries alike, for some, such as those in Latin America, inter-member distances severely limit its effectiveness. While the combination of policy and system has kept the CMEA fromrr achieving its full potential for increasing inter-member trade, its effectiveness does not differ from that of unions among market economies.

We use rolling cointegration to measure the convergence of base money, M2, the CPI and industrial output between Germany and France and recent EU members and some transition countries that are now joining the EU. Countries that joined the EU previously exhibit time-varying cointegration with the core countries over the 1980–2000 sample period. Cointegration for the transition economies was comparable for M2 and prices, but not for monetary policy and industrial output. Thus a peg to the Euro soon after accession is feasible for the East European countries, but the benefits of joining the Euro zone are as yet limited.