This paper examines how and how well do leading economists forecast stock market returns. This question is fundamental in finance, since the Capital Asset Pricing foundation rests upon assumptions about the properties of investors' expectations for stock market returns. The results reveal that economists' expectations of market returns as exemplified in Livingston's data do not meet the necessary conditions of efficiency. It should be noted however, that in later period some improvement in the quality of economists' forecasts was observed.

This paper examines how and how well do leading economists forecast stock market returns. This question is fundamental in finance, since the Capital Asset Pricing foundation rests upon assumptions about the properties of investors' expectations for stock market returns. The results reveal that economists' expectations of market returns as exemplified in Livingston's data do not meet the necessary conditions of efficiency. It should be noted however, that in later period some improvement in the quality of economists' forecasts was observed.

The purpose of this study is to examine the reaction of the Israeli stock market to a major economic reform that took place in Israel on October 28, 1977. On that Friday afternoon, after the closing of all businesses, TV and radio programs were interrupted fora major address by the Treasury Minister. The thrusts of the reform were the liberalization of foreign currency control, the unification of the exchange rates, and the floatingof the Israeli pound.

This paper studies the trading characteristics of listed companies by size, and year-end behavior. There were no transactions on nearly 25% of the days for the smallest decile even at the turn of year which is an active trading period for small companies. As a result of low levels of trading and the regulations governing exchange specialists, transaction prices and quotations of small listed companies may require several days to fully reflect equilibrium price changes. The data confirm the existence of a year-end seasonal pattern in rates of return for small companies and suggest that there may be a seasonal pattern for large companies as well.

We examine insider trading activities of all companies traded on the NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq during the 1975-1995 period. In general, very little market movement is observed when insiders trade and when they report their trades to the SEC. Insiders in aggregate are contrarian investors. However, they predict market movements better than simple contrarian strategies. Insiders also seem to be able to predict cross-sectional stock returns. The result, however, is driven by insider's ability to predict returns in smaller firms. In addition, informativeness of insiders' activities is coming from purchases, while insider selling appears to have no predictive ability.

This study uses 90 years of daily data on the Dow Jones Industrial Average to test for the existence of persistent seasonal patterns in the rates of return. Methodological issues regarding seasonality tests are considered. We find evidence of persistently anomalous returns around the turn of the week, around the turn of the month, around the turn of the year, and around holidays.

[This study uses 90 years of daily data on the Dow Jones Industrial Average to test for the existence of persistent seasonal patterns in the rates of return. Methodological issues regarding seasonality tests are considered. We find evidence of persistently anomalous returns around the turn of the week, around the turn of the month, around the turn of the year, and around holidays.]

In this paper, we document regularities in trading patterns of individual and institutional investors related to the day of the week. We find a relative increase in trading activity by individuals on Mondays. In addition, there is a tendency for individuals to increase the number of sell transactions relative to buy transactions, which might explain at least part of the weekend effect.