Since call option trading started on the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) in April 1973, the interest shown by both the investment and academic communities has grown as rapidly as the volume of option trading. In May 1973, the first full month of trading on the CBOE, a total of 34,599 contracts were traded; during 1976, the monthly volume reached 1.5 million contracts on the CBOE and 800,000 contracts on the American Stock Exchange. At present the New York Stock Exchange and certain regional exchanges are evaluating the feasibility of adapting option trading for their respective exchanges.

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the New York Stock Exchange are concerned with the full disclosure of information insiders normally would be expected to possess about their company, including any facts that would materially affect the market's valuation of the firm's worth if they were publicly known. At present, the regulatory agencies have limited their activities to the collection and dissemination of historical information and facts. The motives of insiders, based in large part, presumably, on their knowledge regarding future operating results are hidden from the public eye. The SEC in compiling the Official Summary of Stock Transactions does not require insider to reveal his motivation for trading.

This paper finds a high correlation between the open to close returns for U.S. stocks in the previous trading day and the Japanese equity market performance in the current period. In contrast, the Japanese market has only a small impact on the U.S. return in the current period. High correlations among open to close returns are a violation of the efficient market hypothesis; however, in trading simulation, the excess profits in Japan vanish when transactions costs and transfer taxes are included.

Since the early 1960's the European capital market has witnessed rapid growth as a source of short- and long-term dollar denominated funds to international borrowers and as an alternative investment area to potential lenders. While considerable work has analyzed the determinants of short-term dollar denominated Eurorates (Eurodollar yields), less work has concentrated on the determinants of long-term dollar denominated (Eurobond yields under floating rates and post-capital controls.

Foreword by Paul A. Volcker Introduction by Hans R. Stoll International Imbalances and International Policy Coordination Exchange Rates and International Imbalances by John H. Makin Exchange Rates and Balance-of-Payments Adjustment: The Post-1945 Experience by Samuel I. Katz Deficits and Imbalances by Knut Anton Mork Future Challenges to the International Monetary System by Richard N. Cooper The U.S. Trade Deficit and the U.S. Fiscal Deficit: Cause and Effect by Robert Z. Aliber International Economic Policy: The Role of Exchange Rates by Edwin M. Truman Understanding the Foreign Exchange Market by Scott E. Pardee International Economic Policy Issues by Jacob A. Frenkel Economic Policy Coordination by Paul W. McCracken Central Banking: A Japanese Perspective by Shijuro Ogata Dos and Don'ts for Macroeconomic Policy by E. Gerald Corrigan Question and Answer Session I The International Debt Crisis An Overview of the International Debt Crisis by Robert Solomon Question and Answer Session II The LDC Debt Crisis: An Interpretation of History by Richard A. Debs The Debtor Position in Perspective by Helen B. Junz Current Developments in the Debt Crisis by Richard D. Erb Question and Answer Session III Global Financial Markets Financial Futures Markets by Richard L. Sandor Option Markets by Alger B. (Duke) Chapman Japanese Financial Markets by Scott E. Pardee The Global Markets: Where Do We Stand? by David E. Bodner International Equity Market Links by Joseph R. Hardiman Global Futures Trading Systems by William J. Brodsky The Shape of World Equity Markets by Hans R. Stoll International Finance and Financial Policy: Implications for Investors by William B. Hummer Index

This study investigates whether the market-determined systematic risk of the companies that used leasing extensively was affected by ASR 147, the FASB's August, 1977, exposure draft on lessee accounting, and SFAS 13. Three samples of companies were used in the study: (1) companies which engaged in a lot of leasing, (2) companies which did very little leasing, and (3) a random sample of companies. The leasing sample and the non-leasing sample were matched by Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code. There was no significant change in the systematic risk of the sample companies pre- and post-June, 1973. There was no significant change in the systematic risk of the three groups of companies pre- and post-August, 1975. This leads to the conclusion that the SEC's ASR 147 and the FASB's pronouncement had little effect on the market's assessment of systematic risk.