Joshua K. Hausman of University of Michigan reviews “False Dawn: The New Deal and the Promise of Recovery, 1933–1947” by George Selgin. The Econlit abstract of this book begins: “Explores how the United States recovered from the Great Depression and whether the New Deal helped or hindered that recovery, evaluating specific policies implemented during this period.”

Taylor (2019) details heterogeneity in the effects of the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) across industries and across time. Through first the President’s Reemployment Act (PRA) and then industry-specific “codes of fair competition,” the NIRA raised wages and restricted working hours. In some—but far from all—cases industries also used a NIRA code to collude, raising prices and restricting output. The effect of the NIRA peaked in fall 1933 and winter 1934; thereafter, compliance declined. I review the intellectual history of the NIRA, the implementation of the PRA and the NIRA codes, and Taylor’s econometric evidence on their effects. I end with a discussion of the implications of Taylor’s book for understanding the effect of the NIRA on US recovery from the Great Depression.

Conventional wisdom has it that in the 1930s fiscal policy did not work because it was not tried. This paper shows that fiscal policy was tried in 1936. The veterans' bonus of 1936 paid 2 percent of GDP to 3.2 million veterans; the typical veteran received a payment equal to per capita income. Multiple sources, including a household consumption survey, show that veterans spent the majority of their bonus. Point estimates of the MPC are between 0.6 and 0.75. Spending was concentrated on cars and housing in particular.

From March to July 1933, US industrial production rose 57 percent. We show that an important source of recovery was the effect of dollar devaluation on farm prices, incomes, and consumption. Devaluation immediately raised traded crop prices, and auto sales grew more rapidly in states and counties most exposed to these price increases. The response was amplified in counties with more severe farm debt burdens. For plausible assumptions about farmers’ relative MPC, the incidence of higher farm prices, and the aggregate multiplier, this redistribution to farmers accounted for a substantial portion of spring 1933 growth. This farm channel thus provides an example of how the distributional consequences of macroeconomic policies can have large aggregate effects. That recovery in 1933 benefited from redistribution to farmers suggests an important limitation to the use of 1933 as a guide to the effects of monetary regime changes in other circumstances.