We document a housing wealth effect on the stock liquidity of local firms. We first demonstrate that the heterogeneity of homeownership rates across geographical areas can explain variations in the impact that changes in house prices have on local stock liquidity. We then show, consistent with expectations that an increase in housing wealth leads to a reduction in household risk aversion, that the liquidity of lottery stocks and stocks dominated by individual investors rises. We also show that it promotes local liquidity commonality and reduces the proportion of firm-specific information revealed in stock returns.

We find that companies dramatically raise their incumbent executives’ pay, especially equity-based pay, after losing executives to other firms. The pay raise is larger when incumbent executives have greater employment mobility in the labor market, when companies lose senior executives, and when job-hopping executives receive favorable job offers in their new firms. A company׳s subsequent pay raise to incumbent executives after losing an executive diminishes its deficiency in executive compensation relative to its industry peer firms, and is effective at retaining its incumbent executives. Overall, our evidence suggests that executive job-hopping activity has significant effects on firms’ compensation policies.

We show that randomly-selected Regulation SHO pilot firms respond to an increased threat of short selling by significantly improving their employee relations. Pilot firms enhance employee security to reduce the likelihood of employee-related negative publicity. The reduction of workplace concerns is most evident among pilot firms with higher degree of earnings manipulation, short interest potential, likelihood of labor disputes and employee whistle-blowing. Pilot firms experience better stock performance during the post Reg-SHO period after easing workplace concerns. Overall, our study provides novel evidence that the removal of short-selling constraints has a real effect on labor relations.

We investigate the impact of cyberattacks on a firm's equity issuance decisions. Our findings indicate that firms targeted by cyberattacks are less likely to pursue seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) afterward. This effect is more pronounced when the target firm has lower external financing needs and operates in a poor information environment. This result remains robust after addressing sample selection bias through propensity score matching and entropy balancing approaches. We attribute this reduction in SEO activities to reputation loss, investors' adverse selection, and the resulting higher equity financing costs. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the negative impact of cyberattacks on SEOs extends to industry peers. This spillover effect is stronger when the target firm suffers significant reputation loss, when the stock prices of peers closely correlate with those of the target firm, when peer firms possess a higher ex-ante cyber risk, and when they are more vulnerable to future cyberattacks.

We examine whether institutions’ monitoring effectiveness is related to the number of their blockholdings. We find that the number of blocks that a firm's large institutions hold is positively associated with forced chief executive officer (CEO) turnover-performance sensitivity, abnormal returns around forced CEO turnover announcements and 13D filings, and changes in firm value. These results are particularly evident when institutions have multiple blockholdings in the same industry, when they have activism experience, or when they have long-term blockholdings in their portfolio firms. Our results suggest that information advantages and governance experience obtained from multiple blockholdings are important channels through which institutions perform effective monitoring.