We argue that conservatism improves investment efficiency. In particular, we predict that it resolves debt-equity conflicts, facilitating a firm׳s access to debt financing and limiting underinvestment. This permits the financing of prudent investments that otherwise might not be pursued. Our empirical results confirm these predictions. We find that more conservative firms invest more and issue more debt in settings prone to underinvestment and that these effects are more pronounced in firms characterized by greater information asymmetries. We also find that conservatism is associated with reduced overinvestment, even for opaque investments such as research and development.

We investigate whether suppliers value customer firms’ socially responsible activities by examining the relation between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and firms’ access to trade credit. We posit that firms with better social performance are more likely to receive trade credit because suppliers view customers’ CSR activities as a signal of trustworthiness and of the capacity to meet financial obligations. In addition to this direct channel, we describe other channels: a) trade credit opens the possibility for suppliers to secure a share of their customers’ future business opportunities, which are expected to be higher for socially responsible firms, and b) the risk associated with the diffusion of negative shocks through the supply chain due to trade credit is lower for socially responsible firms, making them more attractive partners for suppliers. Consistent with our predictions, we find that socially responsible customers receive more trade credit from suppliers. This relation is more pronounced in situations where the aforementioned channels are more relevant: namely, when the financial health of a customer is of greater importance to its suppliers; when there are greater information asymmetries between suppliers and customers due to a lack of close transactional relationships; when socially responsible activities are more likely to generate growth; and when suppliers are exposed to higher risk in the customer-supplier relationship. We also document that during the global financial crisis, socially responsible customers offered backward liquidity provision to suppliers by reducing their use of trade credit, which represents an extra benefit of having socially responsible customers in production networks.

Recent research in accounting suggests female directors exert more stringent monitoring over the financial reporting process than their male counterparts. However, an emerging literature in finance and economics provides mixed findings and questions whether females in leadership roles significantly differ from their male counterparts. Building on this literature, we re-examine the link between the presence of female directors, gender biases, and financial statements quality. Using a large sample of UK firms we find that a larger percentage of women among independent directors is significantly associated with lower earnings management practices. However, we show that this relation disappears if we focus on firms that do not discriminate against women in the access to directorships. Finally, we provide evidence that gender biases are associated with lower earnings quality. We interpret our results as consistent with (1) prior evidence that males and females do not differ substantially when performing the same role in highly specialized positions, and with (2) discrimination being an important factor explaining the association between female directors and accounting quality.

We examine disasters caused by individual firms with severe environmental impacts. These disasters trigger industry-wide demand for corporate social responsibility (CSR). We analyze whether affected firms respond by adopting substantive or symbolic CSR measures. We find that firms increase overall CSR performance through improvements in diversity and human rights rather than decreasing environmental concerns. This suggests firms prioritize symbolic CSR to legitimize their operations rather than substantive measures to mitigate environmental harm. We also document diverging costs and welfare effects. On average, substantive CSR actions are costlier and cause lower margins but avoid divestments by ESG-oriented funds while improving long-term credit ratings. Some of these benefits of substantive actions also accrue through symbolic actions at a lower cost.